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Graber: Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 178

ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW:
MARBURY AND THE JUDICIAL ACT OF 1789*

Mark A. Graber**
Marbury v. Madison1 occupies a place of pride in American constitutional
law.
Constitutional commentators regard that 1803 decision as a judicial
landmark, one of the most important cases decided by any court in any country.
Marbury's declaration that a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 was

unconstitutional, scholars of all constitutional persuasions and professional
affiliations agree, provided the necessary and sufficient foundations for judicial

review in the United States. Such claims as "John Marshall's famous opinion in
Marbury... established the Court as the final arbiter of the meaning of the
Constitution, 3 litter the scholarly literature on constitutional law, theory, politics,
and history. American constitutional law, in the received pedagogical canon, is
largely a footnote to Marbury. "Judging from existing constitutional law

casebooks," Professor Sanford
Levinson observes, "apparently everyone needs to
4

know Marbury v. Madison."
Professor Levinson, the honoree at this symposium, abhors this pedagogical
practice. Throughout his career, he has fought a powerful rearguard action
against the canonization of Marbury. Although the casebook he co-edits includes
a lengthy excerpt of John Marshall's opinion,5 Professor Levinson steadfastly

* Distinguished scholars are known by the work they do and the work they make possible. While
most essays in this symposium discuss the work Professor Levinson has done, this essay is better
described as a work Professor Levinson has made possible. His work has inspired a younger
generation of scholars to explore the meaning of the Constitution outside the courts and the possibility
of constitutional change. Numerous younger scholars, most notably myself, would not have had
successful scholarly careers had we not had Professor Levinson's help, encouragement, and example.
Much thanks to Keith Whittington, Howard Gillman, Scot Powe, and James Pfander.
** Professor of Political Science, Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B.,
Dartmouth; M.A., Ph.D., Yale; J.D., Columbia.
1. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
2. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 963,
1010 (1998) (noting the consensus that Marbury is the "crown jewel in the constitutional canon").
3. Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme Court Confirmations 35
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1994).
4. Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 2, at 1008; see Jerry Goldman, Is There a Canon of Constitutional
Law?, L. & Cts. Sec. Am. Pol. Sci. Assn. Newsltr. 2-4 (Spring 1993).
5. Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, J.M. Balkin & Akhil Reed Amar, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking:Cases and Materials82-96 (4th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2000).
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refuses to require students to read Marbury when he teaches constitutional law.6
That decision, he declares, is "intellectually dishonest," requires more history than
law students are likely to know, proffers an unoriginal defense of judicial review,
and promotes the pernicious impression that the federal judiciary has a monopoly
on constitutional decisionmaking.7 Professor Levinson in 2003 is celebrating the
bicentennial of the Louisiana Purchase, an event he maintains has had a far more
enduring impact
than Marbury on American political and constitutional
8
development.
This essay furthers Professor Levinson's struggle to knock Marbury off the
constitutional pedestal. John Marshall's opinion is a minor episode in American
constitutional development, particularly when compared with westward
expansion. The reasons Professor Levinson gives for not teaching Marbury,
however, do not adequately distinguish that case from other cases he
enthusiastically teaches. A professor in the legal realist tradition might revel in
"intellectually dishonest" opinions. Scholars concerned with judicial supremacy
should address how the proper interpretation of Marbury plays a crucial role in
contemporary debates over judicial power.9 The more serious problem with
Marbury's place in the constitutional canon is how that case is taught.
Constitutional casebooks promote the jurocentric view that Justices, acting
without outside political support, successfully established judicial review when
they declared in judicial opinions that Justices have the power to declare laws
unconstitutional. This popular notion that Marbury established judicial review by
judicial fiat is nonsense. Judicial power in the United States and other countries is
primarily established by elected officials. Congress and the president during the
first two decades after ratification did far more than the Supreme Court to build
the necessary and sufficient foundations for judicial review (and judicial
supremacy). The Judiciary Act of 17891' did far more than Marbury v. Madison to
establish judicial power in the United States.
Constitutional law casebooks and commentaries weave a creation myth
about judicial review that emphasizes judicial power. Justices, in the received
tradition, acted alone when establishing their authority to interpret the

6. See Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded To Include the Insular Cases and
the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 Constitutional Commentary 241, 246 n. 18 (2000) (noting that
he does not assign Marbury when teaching constitutional law); Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 2, at 1008
n. 137 (same).
7. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373, 389 (1982); see Sanford Levinson,
Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution: A Tentative List of Some Early Lessons, 65 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 7, 20, 21 (2002) [hereinafter Levinson, French Revolution] (noting "the absolutely remarkable
conflict of interest presented by the spectacle of Marshall deciding on the legal status of a commission
that he himself had signed," and "tendentious interpretations of misquoted texts"); Sanford Levinson,
Book Review, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1429, 1439 (1989) (same).
8. Sanford Levinson, Why Professor Lynch Asks the Right Questions, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 45, 48

(2000).

9. See Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (U. Press Kan. 1989);
Sylvia Snowiss, JudicialReview and the Law of the Constitution(Yale U. Press 1990); Larry D. Kramer,
The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001).
10. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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Constitution. Judicial review was established solely by judicial opinions, not by
federal statutes, constitutional provisions, or executive decisions. Elected officials,
when mentioned at all in this constitutional story, are depicted as opposing judicial
rulings or as passively acquiescing in judicial assertions of judicial power. Many
casebooks include Abraham Lincoln's claim that his administration would not be
bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford." None include
any of the numerous congressional and presidential speeches given during the
1850s calling on the federal judiciary to hand down decisions settling the
constitutional status of slavery in the territories. 2
Professor Robert McClosky, Professor Levinson's mentor at Harvard,
penned the most famous account of how Justices by themselves established
judicial review when he described Marbury as:
a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall's capacity to sidestep
danger while seeming to court it, to advance in one direction while his opponents
are looking in another.... [T]he touch of genius is evident when Marshall... seizes
the occasion to set forth the doctrine of judicial review.... The attention of the
Republicans was focused on the question of Marbury's commission, and they cared
very little how the Court
went about justifying a hands-off policy so long as that
3
policy was followed.'
Professor Akhil Reed Amar, Professor Levinson's co-author, similarly
asserts that "John Marshall managed to empower his branch even as he backed
away from a fight with a new and popular President." 4 Debate exists over
whether Jefferson opposed judicial review in theory or merely opposed any
exercise of judicial power that interfered with Republican policies.1 5 Still,
casebooks on constitutional law and more scholarly commentaries on Marbury do
not discuss any instance during the first decades after ratification when an elected
official took proactive steps that helped establish the judicial power to declare
laws unconstitutional. The Marshall Court performed a constitutional solo when
establishing judicial review.
11. 60 U.S. 393 (1857); see The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. IV, at 267-68 (Roy P.
Basler ed., Rutgers U. Press 1953).
12. For a random sampling of the speeches, see Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., I Sess. 1154-1155 (1850)
(speech of Henry Clay); James Buchanan, InauguralAddress, in A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 vol. V, at 430, 431 (James Richardson ed., GPO 1897); James K.
Polk, Fourth Annual Message, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 17891897 vol. IV, at 629, 642 (James Richardson ed., GPO 1897); Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1 Sess. App.,
154 (1850) (speech of Jefferson Davis); Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1 Sess. App., 797 (1856) (speech of
Steven Douglas). See Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1 Sess. App., 232 (speech of Andrew P. Butler); Cong.
Globe, 31st Cong., 1 Sess. App., 95 (1850) (speech of Samuel Phelps). For detailed accounts of
legislative efforts to have the judiciary resolve contested issues over slavery, see Wallace Mendelson,
Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered,38 Minn. L. Rev. 16 (1953); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 46-50 (1993).
13. Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 25-27 (3d ed., rev. by Sanford Levinson U.
Chi. Press 2000).
14. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the OriginalJurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 462 (1989).
15. See Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Strategic John Marshall (and Thomas Jefferson), in
Marbury v. Madison: Documents and Commentary 41 (Mark A. Graber & Michael Perhac eds., CQ
Press 2002).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 38 [2002], Iss. 4, Art. 4
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:609

Contemporary political scientists are challenging this common claim that
judicial power is created largely by judicial decisions. Elected officials, numerous
studies conclude, more often provide crucial foundations for judicial review than
oppose particular judicial decisions. The Supreme Court tends to declare laws
unconstitutional only after receiving fairly explicit invitations to do so by members
of the dominant national coalition.16 Prominent veto players in Congress support
judicial decisions declaring laws unconstitutional by blocking legislative measures
or judicial nominees that might reverse such rulings. 7 Howard Gillman details
how increases in judicial power after the Civil War were consequences of self-18
conscious legislative efforts to expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Keith Whittington describes how presidents during certain moments in political
time champion judicial supremacy as a means for preserving decaying political
coalitions. 9 Prominent academic lawyers are adding their voice to this revisionist
chorus. Professor Levinson's colleague, Scot Powe, documents how the Warren
Court worked in tandem with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to
promote a liberal vision.2 ° Professor Levinson and Professor Jack Balkin have
coined the phrase "partisan entrenchment" to describe the tendency for "[p]arties
who control the presidency [to] install jurists of their liking," who "in turn create
decisions which are embodied in constitutional doctrine and continue to have
influence long after those who nominated and confirmed the jurists have left
office."21 Justices exercise power, these commentators agree, only when other
political actors take the positive steps necessary to establish, maintain, and expand
judicial power.
The process by which judicial review was partly established during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was also more driven by decisions made
by elected officials than decisions made by Justices. Judicial review was first
established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. That measure put in place all the crucial
elements of judicial review, including an explicit authorization to declare federal
and state laws constitutional. Marbury established no additional element of
judicial review. The decision is best understood as an effort to preserve in a more
hostile political environment some crucial elements of the practice established in
1789. Preservation required sacrifice. Marshall Court decisions sought to

16. Graber, supra n. 12; see George 1. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals: Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial
Power, and American Democracy (Cambridge U. Press 2003).
17. Cf.Mark Silverstein & Benjamin Ginsberg, The Supreme Court and the New Politics of Judicial
Power, 102 Pol. Sci. Q. 371, 380-81 (1987).
18. Howard Gillman, How PoliticalParties Can Use the Courts To Advance Their Agendas: Federal
Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 511, 513-15 (2002).
19. Keith E. Whittington, To Say What the Law Is: Judicial Authority in a Political Context
(Princeton U. Press forthcoming 2005). See Keith E. Whittington, The PoliticalFoundationsof Judicial
Supremacy, in Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance and Change
(Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., Princeton U. Press 2001).
20. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 494 (Harv. U. Press 2000) (stating
that "the [Warren] Court was a functioning part of the Kennedy-Johnson liberalism of the mid and late
1960s").
21. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 Va. L.
Rev. 1045, 1076 (2001).
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maintain the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional when deciding cases
by conceding that Congress had the constitutional power to determine for the
most part what cases federal courts decided.
Marbury and later Marshall Court cases also preserved judicial review by
silently transforming what had been understood as an anti-partisan or nonpartisan practice into a partisan practice. Judicial review in 1789 was thought to
be a means for preventing legislative usurpation and for correcting legislative
mistakes. The rise of political parties demolished the political foundations of antipartisan review and made nonpartisan review politically inconsequential. Judicial
review survived in the new partisan political universe brought forth by the
Revolution of 1800 because the Marshall Court, while continuing to make antipartisan noises, used the judicial power only when doing so advanced policies
preferred by at least some members of the dominant Jeffersonian coalition.
Judicial review in 1803 and afterwards was a means for advancing various political
interests, not a device for checking national majorities. The source of judicial
power lay in the relationship between life-tenured Justices and elected officials,
not in the celebrated independence of the federal judiciary. Various federal
judiciary acts and related measures passed by national majorities in Congress
present a more accurate picture of the foundations and purposes of judicial review
than the countermajoritarian rhetoric found in law reviews and occasional judicial
opinions.
This study uses Marbury as a vehicle for studying the judicial and political
responsibilities for establishing judicial review, and the legal and political
foundations of that power. Part I raises some questions about Professor
Levinson's initial reasons for excluding Marbury from his constitutional canon.
Part II discusses the elements of judicial review and the senses in which various
elements of that practice might be thought to be established at any point in time.
Parts III and IV assess the relative contributions Marbury and the Judiciary Act of
1789 made to the legal and political foundations of judicial review. The conclusion
details the merits of beginning constitutional law courses with the Judiciary Act of
1789. That measure is a better introduction than Marbury to the elements of
judicial review, disabuses students of the silly notion that Justices create judicial
power, and raises appropriate questions about the reasons why elected officials
might vest courts with the power to declare laws unconstitutional.
I.

TEACHING MARBURY

Professor Levinson's refusal to teach Marbury on craft grounds is more
Langdellian than Levinsonian. Casebooks in the "Age of Faith" included only
those opinions that editors regarded as models of legal reasoning. The "useful"
opinions that belonged in casebooks, Christopher Columbus Langdell and other
late nineteenth century legal scholars insisted, "bear an exceedingly small

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002
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proportion to all that have been reported., 22 Legal realists denounced this
practice. They rejected pedagogical processes that encouraged students to regard
distinctive modes of legal reasoning as normative guides for judicial practice and
as empirical descriptions of how Justices reached legal decisions. 23 Casebooks
edited by legal realists during the 1920s and 1930s presented students with the full
range of judicial decisionmaking, warts and all, and refrained from highlighting a
few exemplary judicial opinions. This pedagogical practice was designed to teach
that law was a form of politics, that policy considerations influenced judicial
decisionmaking, and that distinctive modes of legal reasoning rarely yielded clear
24
answers to contested legal questions.
Marbury epitomizes the case that belongs in the realist canon. John
Marshall's opinion and final ruling illustrate every prominent rival to the legal
model of judicial decisionmaking. Judicial review, students might learn from
Marbury, was result-oriented from birth. The way the decision interprets the
Judiciary Act2 5 illustrates the malleability of legal language and how such legal
maxims as "interpret statutes as constitutional whenever possible" are abandoned
whenever doing so suits judicial convenience. 2 ' The judicial ruling that William
Marbury was entitled to a commission as a justice of the peace illustrates how
judicial policy preferences better explain most Supreme Court decisions than
law.2 7 The judicial ruling that the Justices lacked the jurisdiction necessary to issue
a writ entitling Marbury to his commission illustrates how Justices strategically
manipulate law to avoid making decisions that might damage judicial prestige and
28
power. Marbury taught in these legal realist traditions would far better prepare
students for Bush v. Gore29 than McCulloch v. Maryland,0 the case Processes of
ConstitutionalDecisionmaking uses to introduce judicial reasoning."

22. C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts vi (Little, Brown & Co. 1871); see
Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 47 (Yale U. Press 1977).
23. Gilmore, supra n. 22, at 77-81.
24. Id. at 68-98.
25. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173-76.
26. See James E. Pander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory
Powers, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1515, 1532 (2001); Amar, supra n. 14, at 453-54. Professor Pfander points
to another possible instance of statutory misinterpretation. "A particularly feisty Court might have
chosen to ignore as improperly retrospective the repeal of the 1801 Act," he notes, "at least to the
extent it operated to deny Marbury a remedy for rights that would have been otherwise remediable
under the law in place at the time of his suit's initiation." Pfander, supra, at 1582 n. 279.
27. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
(Cambridge U. Press 2002); Levinson, French Revolution, supra n. 7, at 21 ("as a Federalist opponent
of the despised Jefferson, Marshall wanted to level salvos questioning the President's integrity without,
however, doing anything that might lead to the Jeffersonians successfully defying a judicial decree, not
to mention Marshall's understandable fear that a contrary decision in the case could well lead to a
Jeffersonian-inspired effort at impeachment").
28. See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 47, 151-52 (CO Press 1997);
Levinson, French Revolution, supra n. 7, at 21.
29. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See Levinson, French Revolution, supra n. 7, at 20 ("Marshall's opinion in
Marbury is no more defensible than is the per curiam opinion (or the concurrence) in Bush v. Gore").
30. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
31. Brest, Levinson, Balkin & Amar, supra n. 5, at 17-51.
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Demanding that students understand the contexts in which most opinions
are handed down would require more massive overhauling of the constitutional
law curriculum and legal education than even Professor Levinson countenances.
Adequately understanding any major constitutional decision requires more
knowledge of history, philosophy, sociology, political science, rhetoric, literature,
and economics than students (or their professors) can be expected to possess.
Still, if McCulloch can be taught to students who have not read Banks and Politics
in America 2or a good study on early American political economy," then Marbury
can be taught to students who have not read The Jeffersonian Crisis34 or a good
political history on the Revolution of 1800. 35 Casebook editors routinely highlight
the passage in Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent proclaiming, "[t]he [Fourteenth]
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 36 even though
students (and professors) are unlikely to have read any Herbert Spencer37 or
Howard Gillman's masterful study claiming that the majority opinion in Lochner
was rooted more in Jacksonian conceptions of equality than in laissez-faire or
Social Darwinist principles.38
Concerns with Marbury's originality are generalizable across the
constitutional canon. Most famous judicial opinions rely heavily on broader
currents of political thought,3 9 none of which are detailed at any length in the
constitutional law canon. The first part of McCulloch is largely a restatement of
Alexander Hamilton's Report on the National Bank.40 The Dred Scott opinion
largely paraphrases an opinion Roger Taney wrote when attorney general denying
41
that former slaves should be treated as American citizens and speeches by John
C. Calhoun in the Senate denying that slavery could be banned in American
territories.42 Casebooks that do not include excerpts from John Stuart Mill 43 and
John Rawls" when discussing twentieth century judicial liberalism need not

32. Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton
U. Press 1957).
33. E.g. Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: PoliticalEconomy in Jeffersonian America (U. N.C.
Press 1996).
34. Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1974).
35. E.g. Stanley M. Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (Oxford U. Press 1993).
36. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. E.g. Herbert Spencer, Social Statics; or, the ConditionsEssential to Human Happiness Specified,
and the Firstof Them Developed (D. Appleton & Co. 1865).
38. Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police
Powers Jurisprudence7-8 (Duke U. Press 1993).
39. See Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American ConstitutionalLaw (Harv. U. Press 1985).
40. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionalityof the Bank, in The Reports of Alexander
Hamilton 83 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Harper & Row 1964); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406-25; see Brest,
Levinson, Balkin & Amar, supra n. 5, at 13-16, 17-30.
41. Carl Brent Swisher, Roger B. Taney 154 (Archon Books 1961).
42. See e.g. John C. Calhoun, The Essential Calhoun: Selections from Writings, Speeches, and Letters
382-89 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., Transaction Publishers 1992).
43. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publg. Co. 1978).
44. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed., Harv. U. Press 1999).
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apologize specifically for not excerpting the debates over the federal judiciary in
the Seventh Congress 45 when discussing Marbury v. Madison.
Many constitutional law casebooks make painstaking efforts to make
students aware that the assertion of judicial review in Marbury did not necessarily
entail the assertion of judicial supremacy in Cooper v Aaron.46 Kathleen M.
Sullivan and Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law, generally considered the most
traditional constitutional law casebook, highlights numerous legal and political
challenges elected officials have issued to the federal judiciary over the past twohundred years. 47 That discussion cites an article Professor Levinson wrote
attacking the common identification of the Constitution with judicial decisions. 48
Given that contemporary claims to judicial supremacy are rooted in an
interpretation of Marbury v. Madison, raising the constitutional status of judicial
supremacy without discussing Marbury seems pedagogically mistaken.49
Professor Levinson's lifelong concern with judicial supremacy may explain
why he overlooks a more fundamental problem with the way Marbury is
conventionally taught. Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking presents
constitutional interpretation by persons outside of courts as an alternative to
constitutional interpretation by Justices. The casebook begins by condemning the
50
view that "the Constitution [is] largely what the Supreme Court says it [is]."
Non-judicial officials, students learn, have both challenged judicial doctrine and
made constitutional decisions on matters that never came before courts." Using
the Constitution outside of the court to weaken claims of judicial supremacy or
judicial exclusivity, however, obscures how many constitutional decisions made
outside of courts promote judicial powers. McCulloch was handed down only
after the federal government and Maryland agreed that the federal judiciary
would determine whether states could constitutionally tax the national bank."
Marshall's assertion, "by this tribunal alone can the decision be made, 53 is a claim
about the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court 54 and a description of the
constitutional settlement reached outside of the courts that the judiciary would be

45. For excerpts, see Marbury v. Madison: Documents and Commentary, supra n. 15, at 310-38.
46. 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958).
47. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 19-29 (14th ed., Found. Press
2001).
48. Id. at 26 (citing Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1071
(1987)).
49. See Sanford Levinson, Why I Don't Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why
You Shouldn't Either, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003) (quoting Jack Balkin) (Marbury
is "a classic" that "can speak in ever new ways to us no matter what our theoretical preoccupations of
the moment" it can be reconfigured to serve the ends).
50. Brest, Levinson, Balkin & Amar, supra n. 5, at xxix.
51. Id. at xxix-xxxiv.
52. Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic
Establishmentof JudicialPower, 12 Constitutional Commentary 67, 84-86 (1995); Dwight Wiley Jessup,
Reaction and Accommodation: The United States Supreme Court and Political Conflict, 1809-1835, at
191 (Garland Publg., Inc. 1987).
53. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 400.
54. See id. at 400 ("[o]n the Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution of our country
devolved this important duty").
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the institution responsible for ruling upon the constitutional status of the national
bank. Repeated incantations that "Marbury established judicial review" (or that
"McCulloch established broad national powers") mask the role constitutional
decisions reached outside of courts play in determining the extent of constitutional
powers exercised by courts. Both as a matter of jurisprudential logic and historical
practice, judicial powers are established only with the proactive cooperation of
elected officials.
II.

ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW

The common claim that Marbury established judicial review is puzzling.
Persons have power only to the extent they are able to influence the behavior of
others. Mere declarations of power hardly demonstrate the necessary influence.
Otherwise, Professor Levinson could establish Levinsonian review by asserting,
perhaps in the pages of the Tulsa Law Review, that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the Garwood Centennial Chair in Law at the University of
Texas to declare what the law is." How Marbury established any politically
consequential power is particularly unclear. A judicial decision declaring
unconstitutional a federal statute interpreted as adding to the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court hardly entails or demonstrates the judicial power to declare
major legislation unconstitutional. The major lines of influence in Marbury run in
the wrong direction. The Justices declared they had the power to declare Section
13 of the Judiciary Act unconstitutional only because they recognized they did not
have the power to force the Jefferson administration to deliver a judicial
commission to William Marbury 6
Marbury established judicial review only from a remarkably jurocentric
perspective on the elements of judicial review and on the criteria for determining
whether those elements are established. A functioning system of judicial review,
students too often learn, involves only judicial behavior. The only element of
judicial review is the judicial authority to declare laws unconstitutional when
deciding cases. This judicial power is established by judicial opinions declaring
that Justices have the power to declare laws unconstitutional when deciding cases.
No element of judicial review involves behavior by other governing officials or is
established by other governing officials. Judicial review was established when the
Justices in Marbury proclaimed their power to declare laws unconstitutional.57
Judicial supremacy was established when the Justices in Cooper v. Aaron
55. Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power in Political Power: A Reader, in Theory and Research 80
(Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards & R. Harrison Wagner eds., Free Press 1969). A vigorous debate
exists over the precise nature of power. Scholars point out that persons also exercise power when they
control political agendas or control cultural resources so as to get others "to act and believe in a
manner in which [they] otherwise might not ..." John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness:
Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley 15-16 (U. I1l. Press 1980). See Peter Bachrach &
Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 947 (1962) (discussing the "pluralist" and
"elitist" models of power).
56. Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1515 n. 1, 1581-82 ("the writ, as a matter of political reality, was simply
unavailable").
57. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-80.
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proclaimed that all governing officials were bound by judicial rulings on
constitutional issues.58
Judicial practice during the first decades of the nineteenth century belies this
simplistic conception of judicial review. Marshall Court Justices, recognizing they
had no power to realize those Federalist constitutional visions that lacked
sufficient political support, pulled numerous constitutional punches to appease
powerful elites.59 Had the Justices ordered the Jefferson administration to deliver
a judicial commission to William Marbury, the writ of mandamus would have been
ignored. Had the Justices declared that Congress could not repeal the Judiciary
Act of 1801,60 the Chief Justice and his brethren probably would have been
impeached. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act might have been repealed had the
61
Justices ruled against Virginia in Cohens v. Virginia. Marshall found a statutory
excuse to avoid striking down Virginia's ban on the entry of free blacks because,
in sport. ',62
as he informed Justice Story, he was "not fond of butting against a wall
Reasons exist in each instance for thinking that Marshall Court Justices thought
elected officials had acted unconstitutionally.63 The Justices in each instance
found reason not to declare the offending action unconstitutional. These frequent
exercises of judicial restraint illustrate various ways the judicial power to declare
laws unconstitutional depends on cooperation from other governing officials.
Crucial political actors must obey judicial decrees, they must respect judicial
independence, and they must not alter the legal foundations of judicial authority.
Justices, acting alone, cannot establish all elements or prerequisites of
judicial review. Courts do not create themselves. The Supreme Court lacks both
the legal and the political power necessary to prevent a constitutional amendment
from repealing Article III. Federal Justices cannot compel private litigants to
bring lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of those laws the Justices believe
unconstitutional. Judicial review functions and is a politically consequential
practice only when political actors outside the courts perform certain tasks and
refrain from engaging in certain activities. Elected officials must create and
empower national judiciaries. National judiciaries enjoy the power to declare laws
unconstitutional only when crucial elected officials pass and maintain laws that
authorize and enable Justices to exercise that power.
A.

Elements

The practice of judicial review requires judges, jurisdiction, litigants,
authority, capacity, independence, and compliance. These categories and their
contents are contestable. Professors Charles Geyh and Emily Van Tassel organize
58. 358 U.S. at 18-20.
59. Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12
Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 229, 250-51, 259 (1998).
60. 2 Stat. 89 (1801); 2 Stat. 156 (1802).
61. Graber, supra n. 52, at 86-87.
62. Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History vol. 1, at 626 (rev. ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1947) (quoting John Marshall to Joseph Story, Sept. 26, 1823).
63. See infra nn. 59, 61.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss4/4

10

Graber: Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 178

2003]

ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW

some elements discussed below differently when they distinguish between
"'decisional' and 'branch' (or institutional) independence." 64 The important point
is that a system of judicial review has numerous elements, all of which must be in
place before courts have the power to declare laws unconstitutional. If a
constitution declares, "Courts have the power to declare laws unconstitutional
when deciding cases," but also "No one shall bring a case without legislative
permission," then judicial review exists only by legislative permission.
(1) Judges/Courts. Judicial review requires judges and courts. Laws are not
declared unconstitutional by justices in regimes that lack a judicial system. No
case analogous to Marbury could have been decided by national courts in the
Confederate States of America. Article III of the Confederate Constitution is
identical in all relevant respects to Article III of the Constitution of the United
States, but the Confederate Congress was unable to agree on legislation
establishing a national judiciary. 5 No judges, no judicial review.
(2) Jurisdiction. Judicial review requires that, for any government action
that might plausibly be thought unconstitutional, some court has the jurisdiction to
decide lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of that government action. This
jurisdiction may be vested exclusively in one court, in all courts, or divided
between various courts. If more than one court has jurisdiction to hear lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of a specific government action, some court must
have the appellate jurisdiction necessary to resolve any differences of judicial
opinion. A specific court may be given final appellate jurisdiction over all appeals
on constitutional matters or that power may be dispersed. The crucial point is that
courts have the power to declare laws unconstitutional only to the extent that
courts have the power to resolve lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of those
laws. No jurisdiction, no judicial review.
(3) Litigants. Judicial review requires that, for any government action that
might plausibly be thought unconstitutional, at least one party have the standing,
capacity, and willingness to bring a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of that
action. This element of judicial review is not an element of constitutional review.
Constitutional courts in France and in some other countries decide constitutional
controversies when asked to do so by members of the national legislature.66 The
practice of judicial review in the United States permits laws to be declared
unconstitutional only in the context of a concrete lawsuit. Courts have the power
to declare a law unconstitutional only when some party satisfies any standing
requirement necessary to bring a lawsuit, has (or is given) the resources necessary

64. Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch in
the New Republic, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 31, 31 (1978) ("[dlecisional independence concerns the
impartiality of judges-the capacity of individual judges to decide specific cases on the merits, without
'fear or favor.' Branch or institutional independence, on the other hand, concerns the general, noncase specific separation of the judicial branch-the capacity of the judiciary to remain autonomous, so
that it might serve as an effective check against the excesses of the political branches").
65. See Marshall L. DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861: An Inquiry into American
Constitutionalism104-05 (U. Mo. Press 1991).
66. See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: ConstitutionalPolitics in Europe 33-34 (Oxford
U. Press 2000).
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to maintain a lawsuit, and is willing to bring a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of a government action. Much twentieth century judicial activism
is explained by more permissive standing rules, federal laws providing litigants
with resources for bringing lawsuits, and greater willingness among Americans to
seek legal remedies for perceived wrongs. 6' No litigants, no judicial review.
(4) Authority. Judicial review requires courts with jurisdiction over claims
of constitutional wrong to have the power to declare the offending government
action unconstitutional. This power to declare laws unconstitutional encompasses
the power to decide all legal and factual issues necessary to resolute the
constitutional dispute before the court. 68 Justices have little power to declare
government acts unconstitutional when they must accept without question claims
that a criminal suspect confessed voluntarily or that a national emergency justifies
limiting speech rights. Judicial authority may be consistent with some deference
to elected officials.
Scholars debate whether Justices should sustain all
government actions a reasonable person might think constitutional. 69 Still,
Congress cannot "tell the court how to interpret the law" or resolve factual
disputes relevant to claims of constitutional wrong. 7° Courts cannot identify or
remedy constitutional wrongs when Justices must defer to any constitutional
judgment made by an elected official or to any official account of the facts
relevant to a claim of constitutional wrong. No authority, no judicial review.
(5) Capacity. Judicial review requires that Justices with the jurisdiction and
authority to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong have the capacity to
adjudicate those claims in a timely and intelligent fashion. Court sessions must be
held with sufficient frequency to enable litigants with claims of constitutional
wrong to have those claims adjudicated while the constitutional dispute is live.
The Justices must have the time, numbers, and other resources to obtain and
process whatever information they believe necessary to resolve those disputes.
Authorizing courts to hear every claim of constitutional wrong may actually
reduce judicial power. "[A] mandate to hear all appeals," Liebman and Ryan
observe, "would overwhelm the [Supreme C]ourt's capacity effectively to
maintain national supremacy in those particular cases in which its superintendency

67. See Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective ch. 4 (U. Chi. Press 1998); Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in Court: The Legal
Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making 149-51 (Princeton U. Press 1990); Mary Ann
Glendon, A Nation under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American
Society 257-69 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1994).
68. Professors James Liebman and William Ryan make related points when they discuss the
constitutionally mandated quality of judicial review. "An Article III court," they maintain, "must
decide (1) the whole federal question (2) independently and (3) finally, based on (4) the whole
supreme law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in the process of binding the parties to the court's
judgment, effectuates supreme law and neutralizes contrary law." James S. Liebman & William F.
Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III
Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 696 (1998). See id. at 770-71, 884.
69. Compare id. at 880-81 with James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 138-42 (1893).
70. Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 68, at 822.
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was most needed." 71 A court system with only one justice, who holds court only
once every ten years for one hour, does not have much power to declare laws
unconstitutional. No capacity, no judicial review.
(6)
Independence.
Judicial review requires that Justices with the
jurisdiction, authority, and capacity to declare laws unconstitutional have the
tenure in office, salary, and other protections sufficient to prevent undue influence
on their constitutional decisions.72 Some casual connections between judicial
decisions and outside influence are legitimate. No one protests when Justices are
convinced by effective oral arguments (as long as other parties have equal
opportunities to present their constitutional opinions). The legitimacy of other
forms of influence is more contestable. Some persons think judicial independence
compromised when judicial appointments are based on beliefs about how a Justice
is likely to vote. More persons object when courts are packed with political
supporters." Judicial independence is clearly absent when judicial decisions are
made at gunpoint. Courts have the power to declare laws unconstitutional only to
the extent that judicial decisions are not controlled by outsiders.
No
independence, no judicial review.
(7) Compliance. Judicial review requires that other governing officials obey
judicial decisions declaring a government action unconstitutional. Courts have
power only when they have an ability to carry their judgments into effect.7 4
Proponents of judicial supremacy insist that elected officials must respect the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court when resolving claims of constitutional
wrong. Others insist that judicial decisions on constitutional issues merely
determine the relationships between the parties before the Court. Governing
officials, in this view, remain free to make independent constitutional judgments
until those judgments are successfully challenged in court. Still, governing officials
must at a minimum comply with judicial orders in constitutional cases. No
compliance, no judicial review.
These elements of judicial review admit of degree. Judicial review does not
exist when any element is completely absent. Justices are powerless when persons
must first pay a trillion dollar filing fee before bringing a lawsuit or when courts
are not allowed to meet. Judicial power is merely limited when elements of
judicial review are partly established. Some limits impair judicial review of
particular government actions. Others prevent Justices from declaring some laws
unconstitutional, while not affecting judicial capacity to strike down other

71. Id. at 766.
72. See id. at 769; Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Calls for Higher Salariesand More Judges, N.Y.
Times AI5 (Jan. 2, 2003) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist) (judicial salaries that range from $150,000
to $192,000 constitute "inadequate compensation" that "seriously compromises the judicial
independence fostered by life tenure").
73. 1 assume all persons would object to the following practice. Whenever the Supreme Court
handed down a decision the dominant national coalition disputes, the president appoints and the
Senate confirms, ten additional Justices to the Supreme Court, known to favor overruling that decision.
The day after the decision is overruled, the ten new appointees resign, only to be reappointed and
confirmed whenever a new occasion arises for their services.
74. Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 68, at 790.
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measures. Resource problems have historically prevented many constitutional
wrongs from being litigated and others from being litigated in ways that provide
Justices with the information necessary to resolve claims fairly.75 Standing rules
prohibit even the most well-heeled from litigating certain claims of constitutional
wrong.76 Too many cases combined with too few Justices create backlogs that
prevent claims of constitutional wrong from being adjudicated in a timely fashion.
These observations suggest that a fully realized system of judicial review may be
practically impossible, given the resources necessary to insure that all plausible
claims of constitutional wrong are fairly litigated. Courts in practice are likely to
have nearly unlimited power to remedy only some constitutional wrongs, more
limited power to remedy other constitutional wrongs, and little or no power to
remedy the remaining constitutional wrongs.
B.

Establishment

Judicial review rests on the weakest element of that practice. If any element
is completely or partly impaired, judicial review is impaired to the same degree.
Judges, jurisdiction, litigants, authority, capacity, and compliance do not suffice to
establish independent judicial power when Justices fear assassination should they
declare particular laws unconstitutional. When one element of judicial review has
weaker foundations than others, the practice of judicial review as a whole rests on
the weaker foundations. If the Constitution mandates judges, litigants, authority,
capacity, independence, and compliance, but leaves jurisdiction to the discretion
of the national legislature, then judicial review rests on statutory foundations.77
The elements of judicial review may be established by law or by political
practice. Judicial review is established by law when authoritative legal texts or
legal authorities mandate the elements of that practice. Article 111, Section 1
provides legal foundations for judicial independence by granting life tenure to
federal Justices. The Supreme Court provided legal foundations for the litigant
element of judicial review by ruling that states must provide attorneys to indigent
persons accused of felonies.78 Judicial review is established politically to the
extent crucial elites or the general population support the elements of that
practice. Elected officials support judicial power by acting consistently with the
constitutional rules set out in Article III, by not passing contrary constitutional
amendments, and by taking whatever steps are necessary to strengthen elements
of judicial review not mandated by the Constitution. Judicial review has strong
political foundations when elites, inside or outside of government, insure that all
persons have the resources necessary to litigate plausible claims of constitutional
wrong. Judicial review lacks political foundations, although every element is
75. See e.g. Lawrence, supra n. 67, at ch. 3.
76. See e.g. U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
77. The national legislature may not, however, be legally entitled to use its power over jurisdiction
to impair any constitutionally mandated element of judicial review. Congress cannot condition
jurisdiction, for example, on judicial willingness to rule in favor of the government. Klein v. U.S., 80
U.S. 128 (1871); Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 68, at 810-23.
78. Gideon v. Wainwright,372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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plainly mandated by the Constitution, when judicial decisions are not obeyed,
Justices murdered, constitutional litigation made too costly, and crucial elites are
ready to repeal all legal foundations for judicial power should the Justices declare
unconstitutional any cherished policy.
The legal foundations for judicial review in the United States are statutory or
constitutional.79 The Supreme Court has constitutional foundations. Article III,
Section 1 mandates that Congress establish that tribunal. The Second Circuit has
statutory foundations. The Constitution permits Congress to decide whether to
create lower federal courts. Congress could have constitutionally guaranteed that
no lower federal court ever declared a law unconstitutional by refraining from
establishing lower federal courts.8 ° Different elements of judicial review may have
different legal foundations. One element may be established by statute, another
by the Constitution.
The legal foundations for judicial review admit of degree. Some elements of
judicial review at a given time may be legally established beyond all reasonable
doubt. The Constitution, on any plausible reading, requires Congress to pay a
salary to Justices on the Supreme Court. The legal status of other elements is
subject to interpretation and debate. Wayne Moore notes in a series of fascinating
papers how multiple sources of legal authority exist. Those sources may be
ambiguous or conflict. 81 Political actors debate what the Constitution means,
whether Supreme Court decisions legally bind all governing officials, and the best
interpretation of important Supreme Court decisions. An ongoing dispute exists
over whether the persons responsible for the Constitution intended that at least
one federal court have the final authority to resolve all cases raising constitutional
issues, whether the Supreme Court is authorized to settle that constitutional
dispute, 82 and the best interpretation of previous judicial decisions on the
constitutional status of federal question jurisdiction. 83 Ambiguous and conflicting
constitutional authorities often render the legal foundations for various elements
of judicial review unclear or merely probable. The Constitution in 2003 requires
that capital defendants be represented by counsel, does not require that capital
defendants be represented by highly experienced criminal defense attorneys, but

79. Had Bonham's Case provided the foundations for judicial review in the United Kingdom,
judicial review in that regime might have had common-law foundations. See Dr. Bonham's Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608).
80. The legislative power to abolish lower federal courts is more contested. The Seventh Congress
did abolish the courts established by the Judiciary Act of 1801. Whether that Act was constitutional
remains the subject of debate.
81. See Wayne D. Moore, Presentation, Reflections on Constitutional Politics in the Early
Judicializationof Reconstruction (Boston, Mass., Aug. 29, 2002) (copy on file with author of article)
(paper presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association); Wayne
D. Moore, Presentation, Toward a Theory of PartialConstitutionalAuthority (S.F., Cal., Sept. 2, 2001)
(available at <http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/026/026015MooreWayne.pdf>) (paper presented at the
2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association).
82. See Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 34-36 (1990).
83. See infra nn. 137-38.
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does not establish the precise degree of competence counsel must display in a
capital case.
While constitutional commentary highlights the legal foundations for judicial
review, the political foundations are more vital. Judicial review is a politically
consequential practice, one worthy of study, only when that practice enjoys
substantial political support. A system of judicial review does not function, no
matter how strong the legal foundations, when Justices know they will be
murdered should they vote to declare any law unconstitutional. By comparison, a
system of judicial review can function without legal foundations. When Justices
are willing to declare laws unconstitutional and the army enforces all judicial
decrees (even those military leaders think mistaken), Justices have power to
declare laws unconstitutional. Legal texts to the contrary in such a regime may
influence the description, not the reality, of that judicial power.
The political and legal foundations of judicial review are closely related.
Legal foundations of judicial review often serve as political foundations. Political
elites may support judicial review, at least in part, when they believe the law
requires that support. Political foundations, in turn, often determine legal
foundations. Whether crucial political elites establish, maintain, strengthen,
weaken, or abolish various elements of judicial review depends whether they
support judicial review in the abstract or believe that an empowered judiciary will
serve their more immediate political interests.
The political foundations of judicial review admit of degree. Crucial political
actors tend to support a range of possible judicial decisions rather than judicial
power per se. Diffuse support for judicial review among elected officials and the
general public provides the political foundations necessary for courts to resolve
perceived constitutional technicalities as the Justices see fit, diverge slightly from
public and legislative preferences on most politically charged constitutional issues,
and perhaps even diverge more sharply from public and legislative preferences on
a few hotly contested constitutional questions." The Rehnquist Court need not
worry about political backlash (or hope for increased political support) should the
Justices reconsider whether Congress may constitutionally add to the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Popular majorities may stomach judicial
decisions decriminalizing homosexual sodomy, but not decisions legalizing gay
marriage. Alternatively, the political foundations of judicial review may not be
weakened if a decision legalizing gay marriage is the only constitutional question
on which the Justices issue a sharp challenge to the present constitutional status
quo. Much depends on the coalitions that form to strengthen, maintain, and
weaken judicial power. The constitutional politics of abortion demonstrate how
controversial decisions both inspire attacks on judicial review while bringing forth
new champions of judicial power. A coalition of gay rights activists and
proponents of state rights may provide sufficient foundations for a court that

84. See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 635 (1992).
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strikes down bans on gay marriages and declares unconstitutional the Violence
Against Women Act.
Claims that Marbury established judicial review do not have a single
meaning, given the numerous elements of judicial review and the numerous senses
in which those elements might be established. Assertions that a judicial decision,
law, or some other event "established judicial review" invariably require
numerous qualifications. The relevant event may establish all elements of judicial
review. More likely, a particular event influences only a few elements of judicial
review. The other elements of judicial review may have previously been
established or remain unestablished. The event may contribute to the judicial
power to declare any law unconstitutional or merely influence the judicial power
to declare particular laws unconstitutional. The elements of judicial review
influenced, after the decision, law, or event, may be fully realized or merely less
impaired. Establishment may be legal or political. Legal establishment may be
statutory or constitutional, by legal text or by legal authority. Events that help
establish some element of judicial review may have little impact on or even
weaken other elements of that practice. When teaching or discussing judicial
review, therefore, constitutionalists must clarify what they mean by "the
establishment of judicial review," and consider in more depth what decisions, laws,
and events established that judicial power in the relevant senses.
III. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
Marbury did not establish judicial review in some universal sense. Some
elements of judicial review cannot be established by judicial decree. The Supreme
Court could not have created and initially staffed the Supreme Court. The
judiciary may not prevent crucial political actors who either disagree with judicial
review on principle or with the course of judicial decisions from changing the
statutory and constitutional foundations for judicial power. As significantly,
Marbury did far less than a judicial decision might have done to establish judicial
review. The decision largely justified and confirmed a previously established
element of judicial review, the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional
when deciding cases. While strengthening the authority element of judicial
review, Marbury and other cases decided during the first two decades after the
Constitution was ratified weakened the jurisdictional element of judicial review by
providing precedential foundations for the legislative power to withhold federal
jurisdiction over cases raising claims of constitutional wrong. Overall, judicial
review was less established legally five years after Marbury was decided than five
years before.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did far more than Marbury to establish judicial
review. That measure provided explicit legal foundations for all seven elements of
judicial review. Marbury provided explicit legal foundations only for judicial
authority. Although the Judiciary Act was a statute, decisions made by the First
Congress have historically been given special constitutional significance. The
congressional decision in 1789 to vest federal courts with the power to declare
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laws unconstitutional is probably a stronger constitutional precedent for judicial
authority than judicial affirmation of that power fourteen years later. The course
of federal judicial review probably would have run unchanged had Jefferson upon
taking office decided to deliver Marbury's judicial commission. Had Congress not
passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 or some similar measure, federal judicial review
would have existed only in constitutional theory.
A.

Precedent

Marbury provided solid precedential foundations for one element of judicial
review, the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional when adjudicating
cases. Chief Justice Marshall when handed down that decision delivered the first
Supreme Court opinion defending that judicial authority at length.
Before
Marbury, one Justice on the Supreme Court had maintained that past precedents
did not justify the judicial power to ignore or strike down laws believed
unconstitutional. In 1800, Justice Samuel Chase in Cooper v. Telfair declared,
although "a general opinion" existed "that the Supreme Court can declare an act
of congress to be unconstitutional,.., there is no adjudication of the Supreme
Court itself upon the point. 86 Marbury removed these doubts. When the Telfair
opinion was published, Chase or the court reporter attached a note to his initial
assertion that judicial review was not yet established, claiming "the point has since
been determined affirmatively by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison.' 87
Future Justices agreed. No judicial opinion written after 1803 by a federal Justice
has questioned the precedential status of judicial review.
Whether judicial review was stare decisis only after Marbury is contestable.
Several Justices in Telfair asserted that judicial review was already settled law.
Justice William Cushing wrote, "this Court has the... power.., to declare the law
void." 88 Justice Patterson concurred.89 Justice Chase previously declared federal
judicial review the law of the land when riding circuit. "[T]he judicial power of the
United States," he stated in United States v. Callender, "is the only proper and
competent authority to decide whether any statute made by congress (or any of
the state legislatures) is contrary to, or in violation of, the federal constitution. ''9°
During the 1790s, the Supreme Court appears to have declared laws

85. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-80.
86. 4 U.S. 14,19 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.). See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 392 (1798) (opinion of
Chase, J.) (refraining from "giving an opinion, at this time, whether this Court has jurisdiction to
decide that any law made by Congress, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, is void");
Hylton v. U.S., 3 U.S. 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) ("it is unnecessary, at this time, for me to
determine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of Congress void,
on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation of, the Constitution").
87. Telfair, 4 U.S. at 18 (opinion of Chase, J.).
88. Id. at 20 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
89. Id. at 19 (opinion of Patterson, J.) ("to authorise this Court to pronounce any law void, it must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution").
90. 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800).
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unconstitutional in two cases, United States v. Yale Todd" and Hollingsworth v.

Virginia.92 Federal justices when riding circuit during the Washington and Adams
administrations frequently asserted and occasionally exercised the power to

declare federal and state laws unconstitutional. 93 State justices before Marbury
asserted the power to declare laws unconstitutional and declared various state
laws unconstitutional. 94 These relatively frequent exercises of judicial power
suggest that Marbury is best interpreted as justifying a previously existing judicial
practice rather than as announcing a hithertofore judicially unrecognized
proposition of constitutional law.

That Marbury established judicial review was a well kept secret throughout
the nineteenth century. Federal justices for more than eighty years did not
acknowledge that Marbury provided distinctive precedential support for the
judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional when deciding cases. Supreme
Court Justices did not cite Marbury as a precedent for judicial review until Mugler
v. Kansas in 1887. 9"

Only three lower federal court opinions decided before

Mugler cited Marbury as a precedent for judicial review. None recognized the
Marbury precedent as particularly important., Marbury was twice included in
string citations of cases supporting judicial power. Both strings included
Dartmouth College v. Woodward.96 One included Calder v. Bul, 97 a case decided
before Marbury.98 In 1808, Justice John Davis in United States v. The William
cited Marbury in a footnote as merely "affirm[ing] ...the general doctrine" of

judicial review "exhibited in the cases cited in the text." 99 These cases were
discussed at far greater length than Marbury, and all were decided before 180 3 . 00

Marbury provided even less support for judicial supremacy. The decision was not
cited as a precedent for the judicial power to bind all government officials until
Cooper v. Aaron in 1957.°1

This citation pattern belies claims that Marbury

played an important role establishing the precedential foundations of judicial
91. See U.S. v. Ferreira,54 U.S. 40, 53 (1851). There was no official reporter at the time the case of
United States v. Yale Todd was decided on February 17, 1794, and the case was not printed. Id. at 53.
92. 3 U.S. 378 (1798).
93. See VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,2 U.S. 304 (1795); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792).
94. See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 20 (1793); Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252 (S.C. 1792).
95. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See Marbury v. Madison: Documents and Commentary, supra n. 15, at 383402 (listing all cases in which Marbury was cited by a Supreme Court Justice); Clinton, supra n. 9, at
120.
96. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
97. 3 U.S. 386.
98. See New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. St. Tammany Waterworks Co., 14 F. 194, 202 n. f (C.C. E.D.
La. 1882) (citing Marbury, Dartmouth College, and Calder); Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F.
Cas. 821, 827 (C.C. D. N.J. 1830) (citing Marbury and Dartmouth College). Two other federal cases
might be interpreted as including Marbury in a string citation of precedents that supported judicial
review. See In re Bogart, 3 F. Cas. 796, 800 (C.C. D. Cal. 1873); Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 419
(E.D. Pa. 1833).
99. 28 F. Cas. 614,617 n. 1 (D.C. D. Mass. 1808).
100. The text of The William included lengthy analysis of Hayburn's Case, VanHorne's Lessee v.
Dorrance, Calder v. Bull, Hylton v. United States, and United States v. Callender. The William, 28 F.
Cas. at 616-17. Cooper v. Telfair was also discussed in the footnote, at much greater length than
Marbury. Id. at 617 n. 1.
101. See 358 U.S. at 18.
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power. The better claim is that important late nineteenth and twentieth century
cases cited Marbury when seeking to establish strong precedential foundations for
modern judicial practice. Mugler and Cooper are the cases that provide
precedential foundations for contemporary judicial decisionmaking, not Marbury
v. Madison.

Many scholars question whether Marbury provides precedential support for
the authority contemporary courts assert when exercising judicial review. Robert
Lowry Clinton and Matthew Franck maintain that Chief Justice Marshall
interpreted the judicial power as extending only to cases concerning the structure
and operation of the federal judiciary. °2 Others maintain that early American
Justices believed they were authorized to declare unconstitutional only those
government practices no reasonable person would think constitutional.0 3
Another school of thought emphasizes that Marbury is a precedent for judicial
review, not judicial supremacy.' °4 Alternative readings exist, and they may better
describe how Marshall and other early federal Justices interpreted the judicial
power to declare laws unconstitutional. 5 Still, nothing in the Marbury opinion
makes clear that the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional is the power
to resolve constitutional issues as the Justices think best, the power to resolve
virtually all questions of constitutional right and power, and the power to bind
elected officials who are not parties to the case before the Court. These aspects of
judicial power would not have clear precedential foundations until after the Civil
War.
The Marbury precedent may be even weaker than contemporary revisionists
suggest. Chief Justice Marshall, when Justice Chase was being impeached,
privately floated the suggestion that Congress should be authorized to reverse
judicial rulings. "I think the modern doctrine of impeachment shou[I]d yield to an
appellate jurisdiction in the legislature," he wrote, permitting "[a] reversal of those
legal opinions deem[e]d unsound.. .."'06 Marshall did not specify how such
"yielding" might take place. The quoted passage might be interpreted as
indicating that he would sustain federal statutes that either reversed or authorized
Congress to reverse Supreme Court decisions. If so, then Marbury does not
provide precedential support for giving the Supreme Court the last word on
constitutional questions. The decision merely authorizes the Supreme Court to
102. Clinton, supra n. 9, at 18 ("the most that may be claimed for judicial review in Marbury is that
the decision entitles the Court to disregard legislation in resolving particular controversies only where
such legislation bears directly upon the performance of judicial functions"); Matthew J. Franck, Against
the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. the Sovereignty of the People (U. Press Kan. 1996).
103. Snowiss, supra n. 9; Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From
Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law 104-06 (Basic Books 1986).
104. Professor Levinson has sympathy for all three restrictive readings of Marbury. See Levinson,
French Revolution, supra n. 7, at pt. 3; Levinson, supra n. 49.
105. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury: Policing Boundaries, (unpublished
manuscript Feb. 11, 2002) (copy on file with author); Mark A. Graber, The Law and Politics of Judicial
Review, in Separation of Powers: Documents and Commentary 54 (Katy J. Harriger ed., CQ Press
2003).
106. To Samuel Chase, in The Papers of John Marshall vol. VI, at 347 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds.,
U. N.C. Press 1990).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss4/4

20

Graber: Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 178
20031

ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW

declare laws unconstitutional when deciding cases, leaving the national legislature
free to determine whether such judgments are correct. Marshall was clearly
willing to acknowledge congressional power to reverse judicial doctrines on
constitutional matters. His reference to "appellate jurisdiction" suggests he might
also have been willing to acknowledge congressional power to reverse judicial
decisions on constitutional matters. Congress, in this view, could overturn both
the judicial holding that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not
be expanded and the specific decision that William Marbury was not entitled to a
writ of mandamus.
Marbury is susceptible to a still weaker interpretation of constitutional
authority, one that entitles the Justices to declare laws unconstitutional only with
explicit or implicit legislative permission. Federal statutory law in 1803 authorized
judicial review by federal justices. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that state
court decisions rejecting claims of federal right, declaring federal laws
unconstitutional, or declaring state laws constitutional "may be re-examined and
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States... ,"07 Marbury
did not arise under this provision of the Judiciary Act, but that clause might be
interpreted as expressing a broader statutory authorization for federal justices to
declare laws unconstitutional in any case over which they had jurisdiction. No way
exists for determining whether the Supreme Court would have asserted the power
to declare laws unconstitutional in Marbury had the Congress that repealed the
Judiciary Act of 1801 also repealed the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789
authorizing judicial review. If Marshall was willing to interpret Marbury as
consistent with a legislative power to override judicial decisions, perhaps he would
have interpreted Marbury as consistent with a law forbidding the Supreme Court
from declaring federal (or state) laws unconstitutional when deciding cases. His
opinion does not expressly rule out this possibility. When the Supreme Court in
United States v. Klein held that Congress could not dictate results to the Justices
on statutory or constitutional issues, l0 s the Justices did not cite Marbury v.
Madison as supporting their holding.
Marbury, in short, provides unambiguous precedential support for only the
most limited judicial authority to declare laws unconstitutional. After Marbury,
the scope of congressional power over judicial review remained unclear. Stare
decisis after 1803 did not compel courts to declare unconstitutional federal
statutes overriding judicial decisions or forbidding Justices from declaring laws
unconstitutional. The extent of the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional
was similarly not clarified in 1803. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion has been
plausibly interpreted as asserting that the Justices may declare unconstitutional
only laws regulating the judiciary or only laws no reasonable person thinks
constitutional.1 °9 Marbury provided little precedential support for claims that the
Constitution requires Justices to resolve every legal and factual issue relevant to
107. 1 Stat. at 85-86.
108. 80 U.S. at 146-48.
109. See supra nn. 69, 103 and accompanying text.
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the constitutional dispute before the Court. With a few exceptions decided during
the 1990s, the cases that Liebman and Ryan maintain demonstrate the
constitutionally mandated quality of judicial review do not cite Marbury v.
Madison.1 o

Marbury provided precedential foundations for only one element of judicial
review, the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional when deciding cases.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion said nothing about the legislative obligation to
create a Supreme Court, staff that Court, authorize that Court to meet with
reasonable frequency, provide that Court with the jurisdiction necessary to resolve
constitutional debates, guarantee the independence of the Justices on that Court,
and ensure that potential litigants had the resources necessary to bring their

constitutional claims before that Court. One might interpret the assertion, "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is,

'

as implying that all elements of judicial review have the same constitutional

foundations as judicial authority. The next sentence, "[tihose who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret the rule,, 112 however,
suggests that Marbury's holding is confined to judicial obligations when deciding
cases. The elements of judicial review associated with the process by which cases
come before the Supreme Court may have entirely different foundations.
Contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions suggest this more narrow
understanding of Marbury is correct.

Jay, Ellsworth, and Marshall Court

precedents support claims that the jurisdictional element of judicial review lack
the constitutional foundations of the authority element of judicial review. During
the first two decades of constitutional life, these tribunals held that Congress has

the constitutional power to determine and withhold the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over cases raising claims of constitutional wrong.
Marbury was part of a series of decisions holding that the Constitution does

not vest the Supreme Court with the power to adjudicate most cases raising
federal constitutional issues. The crucial passage of Article III, Section 2 states,

110. These cases are Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409; Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. 561 (1864) (Justice
Taney's opinion was published later in 117 U.S. 697 (1864)); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590
(1874); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816); Cohens, 19 U.S. 264 (Cohens does cite Marbury,
but only to criticize the portion of the opinion suggesting that Congress may not subtract from the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, id. at 300); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858); Klein, 80
U.S. 128; The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247 (1867);Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In addition,
Liebman and Ryan cite at least twenty "Mixed Question" cases decided in the twentieth century, none
of which cite Marbury. Liebman and Ryan do discuss Marbury as providing precedential support for
their claim that the Supreme Court must resolve all relevant issues relying on all relevant law whenever
the Justices have jurisdiction to resolve a case. Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 68, at 811-15; Cohens, 19
U.S. at 299-302.
The cases that cite Marbury are Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995), and City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516, 529, 535-36 (1997); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S.
749, 760 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (but note that the bulk of Liebman and Ryan's analysis is
devoted to the majority opinion, which does not cite Marbury).
111. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
112. Id.
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"[i]n all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." Before Marbury, the Justices ruled that
the Supreme Court could not resolve any appeal unless Congress by statute had
provided for jurisdiction. Chief Justice Ellsworth in 1796 declared, "[i]f Congress
has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate
jurisdiction .... . 113 Ten years later, in Durousseau v. United States, the Marshall
Court made clear that the legislative power to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court included the power to decline to vest the Court
with any jurisdiction over an issue. 114 The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall
held, could exercise appellate jurisdiction only in those cases where Congress
chose to vest the Justices with jurisdiction. If Congress refrained from vesting the
courts with federal question jurisdiction, then the Supreme Court had no power to
resolve the vast majority of cases raising questions of constitutional wrong.
Marbury supports these holdings by ruling out the other plausible interpretation
of the Exceptions Clause in Article III, Section 2. Marbury held that the
legislative power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is not the power to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction when the
Constitution initially provides for appellate jurisdiction. If this is so, then the
power to make exceptions to appellate jurisdiction must be the power to withhold
the appellate jurisdiction set out in Article III.
Marbury also weakened judicial power by establishing a strong precedent
against any freestanding judicial power to issue writs of mandamus. Professor
James Pfander provides much historical evidence that lawyers during the
eighteenth century thought high courts had an inherent power to issue certain
writs." 5 The constitutional basis for jurisdiction in Marbury, he suggests, was
Article III, Section 1, which establishes the Supreme Court as the highest tribunal
in the land, not Article III, Section 2, which details the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.' 6 Marshall in Marbury rejected this
freestanding judicial power. His opinion provides the precedential foundations
for the modern view that Justices may issue writs of mandamus and otherwise
exercise judicial power only when their jurisdiction is derived from Article III,
Section 2.117 Antebellum Supreme Court cases, citing Marbury, made clear that
federal courts could issue various writs only when authorized to do so by
Congress. 8
These decisions limited the judicial power to declare laws

113. Wiscart v.D'Auchy, 3 U.S. 321,327 (1796).
114. 10 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1810); see U.S. v. Goodwin, 11 U.S. 108, 110 (1812) (stating Supreme Court
has no appellate jurisdiction in the absence of legislation). Justice Story insisted that the Constitution
required that Congress vest at least one federal court with the power to decide federal questions, but
he nevertheless believed that courts could not legally take this jurisdiction in the absence of a statute.
Martin, 14 U.S. at 334-35, 341-42; see White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C. D. R.I. 1818).
115. Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1535-72.
116. Id. at 1547-49, 1568, 1602.
117. Id. at 1561.
118. See Kendall v. U.S., 37 U.S. 524 (1838). See Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1595-96.
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unconstitutional by foreclosing avenues by which Justices might have been able to
identify and remedy constitutional wrongs without statutory permission from
Congress.
The rulings on the jurisdictional element of judicial review were part of the
Marshall Court's effort to conduct an advance and retreat maneuver on the same
field of battle. The Justices did not, as has been suggested," 9 charge in one
direction while their political opponents looked elsewhere. The crucial judicial
rulings all concerned judicial power.
Marshall Court decisions provided
precedential support for one element of judicial review while rejecting another
element of that practice. Marbury and other cases held that Justices have the
power to declare laws unconstitutional when resolving cases. Other cases and
Marbury held that Congress largely determines which cases federal courts will
resolve. Even discounting the sacrifice of judicial power Marshall might have
countenanced to forestall the Chase impeachment, Marbury clearly indicates that
Justices cannot by themselves supply important foundations for review. Judicial
review, Marshall Court precedent decrees, is established only when elected
officials provide courts with the jurisdiction necessary to resolve cases raising
claims of constitutional wrong.
B.

Statutory and ConstitutionalFoundations
1.

20

Marbury

Marbury established the legal foundations for judicial review only if legal
materials in 1803 did not already clearly authorize the Justices to declare laws
unconstitutional when deciding cases. Judicial elaboration is necessary to settle
constitutional meanings when other constitutional sources conflict or are
ambiguous. Some constitutional provisions do not require judicial elaboration.
That teenagers are not eligible for the presidency is well established, even though
no judicial precedent presently exists on this point. Had Article III declared, "the
Supreme Court shall have the power to determine whether federal and state laws
are constitutional," the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional would have
been established by the persons who framed and ratified the Constitution.
Marbury would have merely confirmed the legal foundations for judicial review.
Judicial decisions that conflict too sharply with other legal authorities may not
establish any proposition of law. Social conservatives do not believe that Roe v.

119. McCloskey, supra n. 13.
120. Marbury provided legal foundations for judicial review only to the extent that Marbury
provided precedential foundations for that power. The problems noted above with claims that
Marbury provided a strong precedent for judicial review cast doubt on the extent to which Marbury
established the legal foundations for judicial review. Many precedents for judicial review existed
before 1803. Justice Chase aside, no other federal judge thought a more explicit precedent necessary
to establish the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional. No antebellum Justice cited Marbury
as playing a greater role establishing judicial review or any element of judicial review than other cases
in which Justices declared laws unconstitutional.
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Wade 21 or Planned Parenthood v. Casey122 established that the Constitution
forbids government to ban abortion. Social liberals do not believe that Bowers v.
Hardwick1 23 established that the Constitution permits government to ban
homosexual sodomy. Had Article III declared, "the Supreme Court shall not have
the power to determine whether federal and state laws are constitutional,"
Marbury may have been regarded as judicial usurpation, not the decision that
established an element of judicial review.
Little evidence supports claims that Marbury established or even
significantly augmented the legal foundations for judicial power. American
political elites during the last years of the eighteenth century agreed that the
constitutional text, history, and practice authorized some form of judicial
review. 124 Federalists and anti-Federalists during the ratification debates agreed
that federal courts were authorized to declare laws unconstitutional. Publius and
Brutus disputed the scope and merits of judicial review, not the constitutionality
125
of that practice.
No one protested when the Judiciary Act of 1789 quite clearly
authorized the Supreme Court to review state decisions determining the
constitutionality of state and federal statutes.126 When members of the first six
Congresses spoke of judicial review, which was not often, they indicated that the
practice had solid legal foundations."'
American constitutionalists before
Marbury did not agree on how judicial power should be exercised, but Marbury
did not clearly settle those disputes.
Marbury suggests that Marbury added little to the law of judicial review.
"The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law
of the land," Chief Justice Marshall declared, "is..., happily, not of an intricacy
proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain
principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it. '1 28 Much
of the argument that followed reiterated points that Alexander Hamilton made in
Federalist 78129 and that Justice Patterson made in Vanhorne's Lessee v.
Dorrance.130 Marbury, at best, merely stated explicitly legal and constitutional
arguments for judicial review previously taken for granted. Unlike Roe v. Wade
or Brown v. Board of Education,3' the decision simply highlighted a proposition
of constitutional law clearly implicit in previous legislative and judicial practice.

121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
123. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
124. See Marbury v. Madison: Documents and Commentary, supra n. 15, at 235-59.
125. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist Papers 464-72 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., New Am. Library 1961); Essays of Brutus, in The Anti-Federalist 103, 165-85 (Herbert
Storing ed., U. Chi. Press 1985.
126. 1 Stat. 73.
127. Marbury v. Madison: Documents and Commentary, supra n. 15, at 260-78.
128. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added).
129. Hamilton, Madison & Jay, supra n. 125, at 464-69.
130. 2 U.S. at 309-15. See Treanor, supra n. 105.
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Jeffersonians who after 1800 challenged judicial authority did not think
Marbury established the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional.
Republicans who publicly attacked both judicial review and judicial supremacy
during the debates over whether to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801 did not in
1803 concede that judicial power was now legally established by judicial decree.
Jefferson regarded virtually the entire decision as "obiter dictum., 132 His
supporters in Congress impeached one Federalist Justice, almost impeached
another, and might have moved to impeach Chief Justice Marshall for his conduct
of the Burr trial had they not been distracted by a foreign policy crisis. 33 In 1825,
the Jeffersonian Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the
argument in Marbury to be "inconclusive."' 134 Jeffersonians and Jacksonians
would, after 1805, give more support to judicial power. No one claims they did so
because they felt legally obligated to respect Marbury.
Contemporary scholars do not rely on doctrinal arguments or Marbury when
justifying judicial review. The Marbury precedent plays little role in arguments
about judicial review made by such originalists as Robert Bork, Raoul Berger, and
Keith Whittington, by such institutionalists as Cass Sunstein, Alexander Bickel,
and John Hart Ely, and by such aspirationalists as Laurence Tribe, Michael Perry,
and Sotirios Barber. Members of leading schools of constitutional thought cite
Marbury when making claims about judicial review. Nevertheless, they note only
that Marbury made (or did not make) a valid constitutional argument, attaching
no doctrinal significance to the particular details of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion. Ronald Dworkin comes closest to making a stare decisis argument for
judicial review when he claims that "the most straightforward interpretation of
American constitutional practice shows that our judges have final interpretive
Still, Dworkin does not restrict these "constitutional practices"
authority .... ,'
to legal precedents. He speaks of "the decisions judges actually make and the
public largely accepts ... ,,136 Even in Dworkin's judge-driven constitutional
universe, decisions made outside the courtroom provide as vital legal and
precedential foundations for judicial review as decisions made by Justices.
The Marshall Court did as much to weaken as strengthen the legal
foundations of judicial review. Marbury largely repeated well-known and
accepted legal arguments when asserting that the Justices when resolving cases
could declare laws unconstitutional. Federalist Justices were on more contested
constitutional turf when they claimed that Congress need not vest the Supreme
Court or the federal judiciary as a whole with jurisdiction over every case raising a
federal question. Substantial disputes presently exist over whether federal
question jurisdiction in 1787 was thought to be constitutionally mandated. The

132. Warren, supra n. 62 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
133. Graber, supra n. 59, at 252.
134. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 346 (1825).
135. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 35 (Harv.
U. Press 1996).
136. Id.
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traditional view maintains that federal question jurisdiction exists entirely at the
sufferance of the national legislature, except for a few matters of original
jurisdiction."' Professors Akhil Amar, Robert Clinton, and others challenge this
view, claiming that the persons responsible for the Constitution believed that
some federal court had to be vested with the final say over all cases raising federal
questions.'38 Significantly, claims that Congress determines the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are considered "traditional" only because that
view was taken by the Ellsworth and Marshall Courts. Precedent in this area of
constitutional law has made a legal difference. If Amar and others are right about
the views of at least some prominent framers, then Wiscart and Durousseau did far
more to change or settle the constitutional status of the jurisdictional element of
judicial review than Marbury did to change or settle the constitutional status of
the authority element of that practice.
Marbury settled several previously contested constitutional questions about
judicial power. The decision established that Article III does not grant the
Supreme Court any freestanding power to issue writs of mandamus or grant
Congress the option to vest that power in the Supreme Court. The constitutional
law regarding federal judicial power to issue writs of mandamus dates from 1803,
not 1787 or 1789. "Marbury," Professor Pfander points out, "create[d] a
constitutional world in which one tends to regard the Court's power to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus as associated with and dependent
upon its exercise of appellate jurisdiction to revise the judgments of inferior
tribunals.' ' 139 Marbury also established that Article III does not permit Congress
to add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Congress during the
1790s had passed laws expanding the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Justices before Marbury had accepted that jurisdiction.' 40 Marbury decisively
rejected that practice. Nineteenth century Justices repeatedly cited Marbury as
settling that Congress cannot add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
1 42
Court. 41 Marbury continues to provide the main legal support for that claim.
Both settlements limit judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional.
Marbury's holding on mandamus prevents the Supreme Court from exercising a

137. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An
Exercise in Dialectic,66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 68, at 696.
138. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article 111, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741
(1984).
139. Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1605 (emphasis added).
140. Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v.
Madison, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 301. See Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1573-74 (citing three unreported cases,
United States v. Hopkins, Ex parte Chandler,and Hayburn's Cases).
141. See e.g. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 103-06 (1807) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Ex parte Watkins,
32 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1833); Harrison v. Nixon, 34 U.S. 483, 530 (1835) (Baldwin, J.,dissenting); In re
Metzger, 46 U.S. 176, 191 (1847); U.S. v. Chi., 48 U.S. 185, 197 (1849) (Catron, J., dissenting).
142. See S.C. v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 397 (1984) (O'Connor, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in
the judgment); Orrv. Orr,440 U.S. 268, 299 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
& Burger, C.J., dissenting); Ex parte
U.S., 287 U.S. 241 (1932).
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freestanding power to issue various writs that might remedy constitutional wrongs.
After Marbury, no federal court was authorized when exercising original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus without congressional permission.'43
Marbury's holding on original jurisdiction limits judicial power whenever the
Supreme Court cannot engage in de novo review of a state or lower federal court
decision. The quality of constitutional decisions may be impaired, for example,
when the Supreme Court must rely on a record compiled in a state court whose
justices object to the dominant trend of federal jurisprudence. Moreover, by
ruling out the other possible meaning of the Exceptions Clause, Marbury's holding
that Congress cannot add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
supports claims that the Exceptions Clause entitles Congress to withhold appellate
jurisdiction, leaving important questions of federal constitutional law to state
courts. Contrary to the popular notion that the Marshall Court established
judicial review by judicial decree, that tribunal is better credited with the
responsibility for establishing the legal foundations for legislative control over
vital elements of judicial power.
2.

The Judiciary Act of 1789

The Judiciary Act of 1789 did far more than Marbury v. Madison to establish
the legal foundations of the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional. That
measure incorporated every element of judicial review. Congress created the
federal judiciary, provided for the appointment of federal justices, required
federal courts to hold regular sessions for hearing and deciding cases, vested the
Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions that rejected
claims of federal right, power, or authority, authorized the Supreme Court to
declare federal and state laws unconstitutional when deciding those appeals,
provided the court with personnel and processes that facilitated more intelligent
judicial decisionmaking, provided the court with personnel and processes that
facilitated the implementation of judicial decisions, created federal officers who
could litigate constitutional issues before the Supreme Court, and authorized
salaries for various judicial officers. 1" The legislative decision to vest state courts
with original jurisdiction over most cases raising constitutional issues was intended
to make litigation more convenient and less expensive. By eliminating a potential
legal barrier to persons with claims of constitutional wrong, the Judiciary Act of
45
1789 promised to increase judicial ability to declare laws unconstitutional.
The Judiciary Acts of 1789, 1801, and 1802 were the primary sources of law
on judicial review immediately before and after Marbury. Elected officials
determined the extent to which federal jurisdiction could be significantly
expanded or contracted,' 4 whether federal judicial offices could be abolished, and
143. See Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838).
144. I Stat. at 73-93.

145. Amar, supra n. 14, at 455-56; Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1519-20.
146. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics,the JudiciaryAct of 1789, and the Invention of
the FederalCourts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1503-04; Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 68, at 778-82.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss4/4

28

Graber: Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 178

2003]

ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW

whether the Supreme Court could be legally prevented from meeting for a full
year. The Marshall Court studiously refrained from commenting on these
constitutional issues that the Seventh Congress debated at length when
considering the structure of federal courts.147 To the extent any constitutional law
was made during the first decade of the nineteenth century on the meaning of
"good behavior" and judicial independence, that law was made by Congress
during the Chase impeachment, 48 not by any decision handed down by a federal
court.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 and other actions taken by the first generation of
American elected officials laid constitutional as well as statutory foundations for
judicial review. The First Congress has special constitutional standing in
American jurisprudence. Members of the House and Senate in 1789 are thought
to have uniquely valuable insights into constitutional meanings because the
Constitution had just been ratified and many representatives had participated in
the framing or state ratifying conventions. 149 Federal courts were a particular
subject of expertise. William Ryan observes:
Because so many Framers were elected to the first Congress, it is widely accepted
that that body's enactments provide "'contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of
the Constitution's meaning...." This interpretive principle should apply with even
greater force to Article III matters, given that Oliver Ellsworth was both the
primary architect of the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789 and a member of the
Constitutional Convention's Committee of Detail,
which was responsible for adding
150
the phrase "judicial Power" to the Constitution.
If the First Congress mandated that the Supreme Court could declare laws
unconstitutional when resolving cases, then that decision supports claims that the
Constitution vests courts with that power. To the extent the First Congress did (or
did not) vest federal courts with full federal question jurisdiction, that decision is
of similar constitutional significance.'

147. These debates are excerpted in Marbury v. Madison: Documents and Commentary, supra n. 15,
at 310-38.
148. Keith E. Whittington, Reconstructing the Federal Judiciary: The Chase Impeachment and the
Constitution, 9 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 55 (1995).
149. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983); Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 309 (1803); Jay S. Bybee, Who
Executes the Executioner? Impeachment, Indictment, and OtherAlternatives to Assassination,2 Nexus J.
of Op. 53, 61 (1997) ("the First Congress is of the same generation-and included many of the same
people-who drafted the Constitution. We should, the argument runs, defer to their understanding of
the document they drafted"); James C. Ho, Misunderstood Precedent: Andrew Jackson and the Real
Case against Censure, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 283, 284 n. 3 (2000); but see Bybee, supra, at 62
(noting that "[a]s the disgraceful history of the Sedition Act of 1798 demonstrates, the first congresses
were not above disingenuous constitutional arguments to justify political expediency").
150. William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial
Decisions,77 B.U. L. Rev. 761, 770 (1997) (citations omitted).
151. But see Holt, supra n. 146, at 1485 (noting that the Judiciary Act "was much closer to the wishes
of those opponents [of the Constitution] than it was to the wishes of Ellsworth" and other framers),
1510.
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Early legislative decisions provided vital constitutional precedents for
settling questions of constitutional law and judicial review.'52 The framers
recognized that ratification did not settle every possible constitutional question.
"All new laws," Madison wrote in Federalist37, "are considered as more or less
obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a
series of particular discussions and adjudications., 153 Many "discussions and
adjudications" took place outside the courtroom. Four years before the Supreme
Court handed down McCulloch v. Maryland, Madison proclaimed the
constitutionality of the national bank settled by legislative and popular action.'54
Americans by 1840 thought the unconstitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts
settled by legislative and popular action,155 even though every federal court that
considered the matter declared the acts constitutional.1 56 Judicial power was
presumably subject to the same processes of constitutional settlement outside of
courts. The legislative decisions to pass and later maintain Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provides strong precedential support for the judicial power
to declare laws unconstitutional, far stronger than Marbury v. Madison.
Antebellum federal justices ignored Marbury's holding on judicial authority, while
at the same time Section 25 was being repeatedly reaffirmed by Congress.'57
History highlights the numerous ways in which elected officials were far
more responsible than the Marshall Court for establishing the legal foundations
for judicial review. Representatives from state legislatures drafted Article III.
Elected delegates in the states ratified Article III. Elected members of Congress
elaborated Article III when they passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. The First
Congress established federal courts, vested the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to
resolve many (not all) cases raising constitutional issues, and authorized that
tribunal to declare federal and state laws unconstitutional when adjudicating those
cases. These legislative decisions expressed the national consensus during the
1790s that judicial review rested on sound legal foundations. Justices before
Marbury exercised a power to declare laws unconstitutional because that power
was legally established by the persons responsible for the Constitution and their
legislative successors.
The Marshall Court accepted the legislative foundations of the judicial
power to declare laws unconstitutional. The Justices did not interfere when
Congress prevented the Supreme Court from meeting and eliminated federal

152. For a longer defense of some claims in this paragraph, see Mark A. Graber, Antebellum
Perspectiveson Free Speech, 10 Wm.& Mary Bill Rights J. 779, 804-10 (2002).

153. Hamilton, Madison & Jay, supra n. 125, at 229.
154. James Madison, Veto Message, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1789-1897 vol. I, at 555 (James D. Richardson ed., GPO 1896).
155. Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege": Struggles for Freedom of
Expression in American History 136-54 (Duke U. Press 2000).
156. See e.g. Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 836-39 (C.C. D. Pa. 1799); Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239. See
David Yassky, Eras of the FirstAmendment, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1699, 1711 (1991) (noting that "every
Justice on the all-Federalist Court expressed approval of the Act in opinions delivered on circuit").
157. See Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the JudiciaryAct, 47 Am. L. Rev. 1 (1913).
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judicial positions. Several judicial rulings specifically held that Congress could
prevent the Supreme Court from declaring laws unconstitutional by withholding
jurisdiction in all or most cases raising claims of constitutional wrong. The elected
officials who largely determined the law of judicial review after 1787 could, thus,
cite prominent judicial precedents as supporting claims that federal justices could
exercise the power to declare laws unconstitutional only when Congress,
exercising its constitutional discretion, vested federal courts with the power to
adjudicate cases raising federal constitutional issues.
IV.

POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS

Judicial opinions establish political foundations for judicial review when they
induce crucial political elites to support the elements of that practice. What
matters from the political perspective is whether political actors support the law as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, not whether Supreme Court decisions are
legally correct or even whether Supreme Court Justices have a legal right to
declare laws unconstitutional when deciding cases. Judicial review has secure
political foundations when powerful politicians believe they have a legal
obligation to obey judicial decisions, even should their beliefs rest on mistaken
legal premises. Judicial review also has secure political foundations when
powerful politicians believe most exercises of judicial power serve their interests.
Elected officials often have good pragmatic reasons for promoting judicial power.
Politicians frequently hope the judiciary will take responsibility for making certain
controversial policy decisions or support the policies that Justices are making. A
public largely unaware of the content of most judicial decisions may frown on
politicians who attack judicial review.158
A.

PreservingJudicialReview

Marbury neither established nor demonstrated the political support federal
justices must have to exercise any independent power to declare laws
unconstitutional. The decision, James O'Fallon recognizes, "was born out of
political defeat."' 5 9 Federalists inside and outside of the judiciary in 1803 lacked
the power necessary to obtain Marbury's judicial commission or, more important,
to maintain the midnight justices in their offices. The Marshall Court asserted the
power to declare unconstitutional a minor provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789
only because the Justices knew they lacked the power to enforce an order
requiring the Jefferson administration to give William Marbury his commission.
To do otherwise would be "flirting with impeachment."' 6 John Marshall thought
unconstitutional the legislation repealing the Judiciary Act of 1801, but he lacked
the jurisdiction or will to issue a judicial opinion reinstating the midnight

158. See Graber, supra n. 12, at 46-50;. Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic
Environment of JudicialReview, 1 I-Con, Intl. J. Const. L. 3 (2003).
159. James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 219, 259 (1992); Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1582.
160. Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1582; see id. at 1578-82.
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justices.16 His Court also failed to strike down several Jeffersonian measures
favoring French interests that most pro-British Federalists outside the Court
thought illegal. 62 On no disputed question of constitutional law did the Marshall
Court during the first decade of the nineteenth century take any step that
exhibited the practical power to declare unconstitutional any measure a united
Jeffersonian regime thought constitutional. 63 Lacking political support, the
Justices exercised no politically consequential judicial power.
The Supreme Court in 1803 had, at most, the following powers. The Justices
had the power to suggest that the president had acted illegally, as long as the
Justices made no attempt to remedy that legal wrong. The Justices had the power
to declare unconstitutional federal statutes when few persons cared about the
intrinsic merits of the statute, 164 when those persons in power who cared thought
the statute unconstitutional, and when the decision striking down the statute66
prevented the Justices from interfering with more vital administration policies.
Finally, the Justices had the power to issue opinions asserting their right to declare
any law unconstitutional when deciding cases, as long as that right was not
exercised in a politically consequential manner.161
Marbury was an effort to maintain the political and legal foundations for
judicial review established by the Judiciary Act of 1789.168 The decision was
handed down when important elements of judicial power were under sustained
legislative attack. Congress by repealing the Judiciary Act of 1801 had sharply
reduced federal question jurisdiction and raised questions about the meaning of
life tenure. The Judiciary Act of 1802 limited the capacity of the Supreme Court
to resolve constitutional issues in a timely fashion by restricting that tribunal to
one annual session and preventing the Justices from declaring any law
unconstitutional in 1802. Federalist judicial appointees who could not be removed
by repealing the Judiciary Act were threatened with impeachment. The challenge
for the Supreme Court in this political environment was to maintain as much of
the legal and political foundations for judicial review that had been established
from 1787 to 1801, not to further build up that practice. James Pfander properly
recognizes that "Marshall set for himself the task of... preserv[ing] as much
authority as possible for his branch."' 69 "One has the impression," he observes of
161. See Ruth Wedgwood, Cousin Humphrey, 14 Constitutional Commentary 247, 268 (1997)
(reprinting John Marshall to Henry Clay, December 22, 1823).
162. See U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804); Graber, supra n. 59, at 250.
163. See Graber, supra n. 59, at 250-52.
164. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329.
165. Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1520-21, 1583-84.
166. McCloskey, supra n. 13.
167. See Mark A. Graber, The Problematic Establishmentof Judicial Review, in The Supreme Court
in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations28, 36 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton
eds., U. Kan. Press 1999) (noting that "[t]he Marshall Court... vigorously assert[ed] judicial power in
theory while declining to exercise it in practice").
168. See id. at 34-37.
169. Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1521.
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Marshall's opinion in Marbury, "of a hungry man scrambling to store up as much
food as possible for the long Jeffersonian winter that he saw ahead."' 17
The Marshall Court sought to preserve the judicial authority to declare laws
unconstitutional when deciding cases partly by avoiding making anti-Jeffersonian
rulings and partly by permitting Congress to determine what cases the Justices
would resolve. Jurisdiction was partly sacrificed to maintain authority. 7' By
promising that the Supreme Court would not implement Federalist
understandings of judicial power without active legislative support, Marshall
"hoped the Marbury opinion would defuse the political crisis and avoid any
further attack on the judiciary's powers., 172 Nothing in Marbury or in other
Marshall Court decisions forbade a revived Federalist coalition from passing the
legislation necessary to restore the federal judiciary in full Federalist splendor. 73
Marbury and other cases simply recognize that a Federalist Supreme Court cannot
realize Federalist understandings of judicial power in the absence of significant
support from Federalist elected officials.
B.

New Foundations

Marbury also preserved judicial review by beginning the process by which
the political foundations of judicial review were subtly adjusted in ways that
enabled that practice to survive in a partisan universe. Americans in 1803
believed in limited government and that elected officials had no power to pass
unconstitutional laws. The problem was that these beliefs provided inadequate
support for judicial power. The Jeffersonian majority was likely to think
constitutional any major law the Federalist judiciary might be tempted to declare
unconstitutional. Thus, the Federalist judiciary was vulnerable to Jeffersonian
attack less because Jeffersonians had principled objections to the judicial power to
void unconstitutional laws than because Jeffersonians believed that the Marshall
Court was voiding laws that were not unconstitutional. Remarkably, the original
political foundations of judicial review, established by opponents of political
parties, did not contemplate this threat to judicial power.
Americans before Marbury advocated either anti-partisan or non-partisan
conceptions of judicial review. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 articulated
the anti-partisan conception of judicial review when he declared, "[the]
independence of the judges is [necessary] to guard the Constitution and the rights
of individuals from" "the cabals of the representative body" and "momentary
inclination[s that] happen[s] to lay hold of a majority" which threatens "serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community."' 74 Judicial review, in this view,
170. Id. at 1606.
171. Marshall in Marbury may have attempted to preserve the writ of mandamus as a tool to
supervise governing officials. Marshall Court Justices sacrificed the use of that writ when exercising
original jurisdiction in order to maintain the authority to use that writ when exercising appellate
jurisdiction. See id. at 1585-88.
172. Id. at 1586.
173. Id. at 1521.
174. Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, supra n. 125, at 469-70.
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is one of many constitutional practices designed to prevent partisan factions from
dominating political life. Anti-partisan judicial review had political foundations
because the president could be trusted to protect courts from legislative intrigue,
the people could be trusted to protect courts from legislative cabals, and the
people sober could be trusted to protect courts from their unconstitutional
"momentary inclinations."' 7 5 Elias Boudinot during the debates over the national
bank articulated the non-partisan conception of judicial review when he "reflected
that if, from inattention, want of precision, or any other defect, he should [be]
wrong, that there was a power in the Government which could constitutionally
prevent the operation[s] of such a wrong measure from [a]ffecting his
constituents. 17 6 Judicial review, in this sense, corrects those constitutional
mistakes elected officials occasionally make. Nonpartisan judicial review has
political foundations because the people's representatives can be trusted to
recognize their errors or defer to the Justices' superior constitutional wisdom.
Constitutional politics during the first decade of the nineteenth century
demonstrated that anti-partisan judicial review lacked secure political foundations
in a partisan universe. Contrary to Federalist 78, Jeffersonians did not think of
themselves and were not thought of by most Americans as a "cabal." The election
of 1800 was not the result of "momentary inclinations." Indeed, Republicans
maintained they had an electoral mandate to save the Constitution from members
of the deposed Federalist coalition ensconced in the federal judiciary. Resistance
was likely to be futile. President Jefferson would not protect the Court from his
supporters in Congress, the Jeffersonian majority in the electorate would not
protect the Court from the Jeffersonian majority in the government, and that
Jeffersonian majority would prove relatively enduring. The repeal of the Judiciary
Act of 1801, the Judiciary Act of 1802, and impeachment proceedings against
Federalist judicial appointees gave clear signals to the Supreme Court that antipartisan judicial review during the first decade of the nineteenth century would
destroy any remaining political foundations for judicial review."'
Anti-partisan judicial review would not gain the necessary political
foundations in the future. The appointments process and judicial timidity explain
why Justices rarely oppose a united political majority and never do so for any
sustained period of time.178 On the few occasions where courts have attempted or
threatened anti-partisan judicial review, their decisions have often been ignored
by elected officials. Crucial political actors have taken both legal and illegal steps
to curb hostile judicial power. Presidents from Abraham Lincoln to Franklin
Roosevelt have not stood idly by and let the federal judiciary gut their cherished
programs. That prominent politicians may have supported anti-partisan review
when in a political minority does not guarantee they will support that practice

175. Id. at 465-69.
176. 2 Annals of Cong. 1978 (1791).
177. Graber, supra n. 167, at 36.
178. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 50 Emory L. 563,570 (2001).
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when they gain power. Abraham Lincoln, whose first inaugural address is often
considered the canonical attack on judicial supremacy,179 was committed to
judicial supremacy when he was a Whig legislator. 8°
Nonpartisan judicial review has secure political foundations, antebellam
practice demonstrated, when judicial rulings are politically inconsequential.
Legislatures do make constitutional mistakes on minor matters. The Ellsworth
Court declared unconstitutional a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that
Congress forgot to repeal after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified. 8 The
Taney Court with the full support of Congress declared unconstitutional a number
of private federal laws that accidentally granted to one person land that the
national legislature had previously granted to another person. 82 When the issue is
relatively minor, elected officials were willing to defer to judicial judgments.
While grumbling occurred when the Justices declared in Hayburn's Case that they
would not evaluate claims to federal pensions, the matter was not deemed
important enough to challenge judicial authority."'
Nevertheless, constitutional politics during the first decade of the nineteenth
century teaches that courts cannot assure themselves the last word merely by
trotting out their superior expertise or institutional position. Judicial power was
successfully challenged when formerly non-partisan constitutional questions
became partisan political questions. Elected officials were willing to have courts
resolve questions of federal jurisdiction during the 1790s. They were not as
obliging after the election of Jefferson. Jefferson could not have been persuaded
that he mistakenly withheld Marbury's judicial commission. Jeffersonians in
Congress believed the repeal of the Judiciary Act worth fighting for. Justices who
attempted non-partisan judicial review in this partisan political climate were not
likely to remain Justices for long. Marbury suggests a court limited to correcting
non-partisan constitutional mistakes would have as much influence on the course

179. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. IV, supra n. 11, at 267-68.
180. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. I, at 62-63, 112, 171, 247-48, 486 (Roy P. Basler
ed., Rutgers U. Press 1953).
181. Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. 378.
182. Willot v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 79, 82 (1857) (1816 confirmation defeats 1836 confirmation because
"where there are two confirmations for the same land, the elder must hold it"); Chouteau v. Eckhart, 43
U.S. 344 (1844) (claim confirmed in 1812 defeats claim confirmed in 1836); DeLaurie v. Emison, 56
U.S. 525, 538 (1854) ("[tlhe confirmation of the claim by Congress, in 1836, had relation back to the
origin of the title; but it could not impair rights which had accrued, when the land was unprotected by a
reservation from sale; and when, in fact, the right of the claimant was barred"); see Les Bois v.
Bramwell, 45 U.S. 449, 464 (1846); Landes v. Brant, 51 U.S. 348, 370 (1851) ("when Congress
confirmed and completed an imperfect claim, and then confirmed another and different claim for the
same land, the older confirmation defeated the younger one"); Stoddard v. Chambers, 43 U.S. 284, 317
(1844) ("the elder legal title must prevail in the action of ejectment"); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. 223,
233-34 (1850) ("where the same land has been twice granted, the elder patent may be set up in defence
by a trespasser, when sued by a claimant under the younger grant"); U.S. v. Covilland, 66 U.S. 339, 341
(1862) ("a confirmation in the name of the original grantee, divesting the legal title of the United
States, is binding on the Government and on the assignees"). These cases are discussed in detail in
Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 Vand. L. Rev.
73 (2000).
183. Geyh & Van Tassel, supra n. 64, at 72-73; Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A
Misinterpretationof Precedent,1988 Wis. L. Rev. 527, 539.
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of American politics as a linguist limited to correcting only non-partisan
grammatical mistakes in political speeches.
Marbury spouts anti-partisan rhetoric to justify correcting what seems a nonpartisan mistake, but the opinion provides a glimpse of how partisan judicial
review functions. Robert Dahl articulated one premise underlying the partisan
conception of judicial review when he declared, "it would appear.., somewhat
unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of
Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially
at odds with the rest of the political elite."' 84 Justices who do not endorse the
fundamental policy commitments of the dominant national coalition have, more
often than not, found discretion the better part of valor.'85 Judicial review, in this
view, is a practice that helps at least some powerful political elites in government
pursue important policy and electoral goals. These relationships with crucial
actors, not judicial independence alone, provide the necessary political
foundations for judicial power.
Partisan judicial review is both politically consequential and politically
secure. When judicial decisions advance policies favored by most members of the
ruling political coalition or even an important faction within the ruling political
coalition, Justices do not suffer reprisals for at least as long as their political
supporters remain empowered. Sometimes, as was the case during the 1950s,
supportive elected officials who have the power necessary to prevent attacks on
courts are not powerful enough to enforce judicial decrees. 86 At other times, as
was the case during the 1960s, supportive elected officials are able to implement
judicial decisions, pass various laws that strengthen the elements of judicial
power,
•• . 187
while blocking other measures aimed at weakening the federal judiciary.
The
Civil Rights Act of 19641"8 both punished states for refusing to desegregate and
provided resources to litigants seeking to implement Brown.
Courts that exercise partisan judicial review are not necessarily pawns in the
hands of elected officials. On many issues, lawmaking majorities are sufficiently
divided so that a range of decisions exist that will not subject the judiciary to
political reprisal. The Rehnquist Court is politically free to choose whether to
revisit Roe v. Wade. Pro-choice advocates in Congress presently have the power
to kill any bill that punishes the Justices for keeping abortion legal. President
Bush will not sign a law punishing the Court for overruling Roe. Politicians
sometimes want courts to take responsibility for making policy, any policy, when
taking any clear stand on a hotly contested issue is perceived as politically costly.
184. Dahl, supra n. 178, at 578.
185. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic National
Policy-Maker, 50 Emory L.J. 583 (2001).
186. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 42-1.69
(U. Chi. Press 1991).
187. Powe, supra n. 20; Howard Gillman, Presentation, Judicial Politics as Political Entrenchment:
Congressional Democrats and Judicial 'Activism' in the 1960s and 1970s (Denver, Colo., Mar. 27-29,
2003) (copy on file with author of article) (paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Western
Political Science Association).
188. Public L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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On issues as diverse as slavery, antitrust, and abortion, elected officials have made
self-conscious efforts to foist political "hot potatoes" on to Justices.189 Most means
for punishing courts are too blunt. If a politician believes the general trend of
judicial decisions is favorable, then the best strategy may be to live with some
"wrong" decisions. 19° Thus, judicial review has sufficient political foundations
when most judicial decisions declaring laws unconstitutional appeal to at least
some members of the dominant national coalition. In polities such as the United
States, where power is dispersed and fractured, Justices concerned with
maintaining the political foundations of judicial review are likely to have a fair
degree of judicial choice.
Marbury was an exercise of partisan judicial review. The dominant national
coalition did not wish to give William Marbury his commission. The Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a federal law that might have required the
Justices to grant that commission. During the debates over the Repeal Act,
Federalists maintained that Section 13 was constitutional,' 9' while at least one
Jeffersonian insisted that Congress could not add to the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court."'

To the extent the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

was a partisan issue, the Marshall 19Court
took the position of the party in power
3
rather than the party out of power.
Marbury and the Marshall Court laid the foundations for the schizophrenic
nature of contemporary judicial review. The justification of judicial review in
Marbury, in other judicial opinions, and in constitutional commentary is antipartisan. Judicial review prevents legislative tyranny. Without that practice, "the
legislature" would have "a practical and real omnipotence.', 94 The practice of
judicial review in Marbury, in other Marshall Court opinions, and in the vast
majority of later Supreme Court opinions is partisan. The Marshall Court refused
to give Marbury his commission, never declared the Repeal Act unconstitutional,
and supported the Bank of the United States only after the constitutionality of the
bank was affirmed by the President and a strong legislative majority. New Deal
legislation aside, when the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional
politically consequential state or federal laws, the judicial rhetoric may have been
anti-partisan, but the judicial decision promoted policies favored by at least some
influential members of the dominant national coalition. 9' To the extent Marbury
established judicial review, in short, the decision and subsequent judicial rulings
did so by supporting rather than, as Alexander Bickel famously declared,

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Graber, supra n. 12.
Whittington, supra n. 158.
11 Annals of Cong. 903-905 (1802) (speech of Mr. Dana).
11 Annals of Cong. 556-558 (1802) (speech of Mr. Davis).
See Pfander, supra n. 26, at 1582-83.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.

195. Dahl, supra n. 178; Graber, supra n. 12.
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"thwart[ing]
the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
196
now."

V.

FROM MARBURYTO THE JUDICIARY ACTS

The Judiciary Act of 1789 has historically been buried under the confetti
(and occasional rotten tomato) thrown at Marbury v. Madison. Discussions about
judicial review in the United States begin, and too often end, with commentary on
whether Marbury was correctly decided and on the best interpretation of that
decision. Very few constitutional law casebooks or works on constitutional theory
spend much energy considering how the Judiciary Act of 1789 helped establish
judicial review or the constitutional issues associated with that measure. 197 The
Judiciary Acts of 1801 and 1802 make appearances in most studies of American
constitutionalism only as background to Marbury. These and other judiciary acts
are part of the canon taught and analyzed in courses and scholarship on federal
courts, not on constitutional law.
These priorities are unfortunate. The Judiciary Act of 1789 ought to be the
first text students consider in a constitutional law course and scholars discuss when
setting forth theories of judicial review. That measure offers far more insights
about the nature and establishment of judicial review in the United States than
any judicial decision handed down by the Jay, Ellsworth, or Marshall Courts.
Students and scholars will learn as much about the practice and foundations of the
judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional by examining the legislative
debates over the structure of the federal judiciary that have taken place
throughout American history
as by parsing through what judicial opinions have
19 8
said about judicial power.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 reveals far more than Marbury about the elements
of judicial review. Provisions of that statute expressly provide for judges,
jurisdiction, litigants, authority, capacity, independence, and compliance. This
congressional effort to establish a federal court system has generated important
jurisprudential debates over the nature and constitutional status of the practices
that must be in place for Justices to have the power to declare laws
unconstitutional. Commentary on the Judiciary Act explores whether the First
Congress established an adequate system of judicial review, whether that measure
was consistent with Article III, and whether crucial elements of judicial review
were left to legislative discretion.' 99 The Judiciary Act might also be a useful
vehicle for thinking about the constitutional responsibilities of non-judicial
officials and how constitutional changes and settlements often take place outside
196. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 17
(Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1962).
197. For a rare exception, see Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing
America: Institutional Powers and Constraints 60-62 (3d ed., CQ Press 1998).
198. This project is fortunately well underway. See Gillman, supra n. 18; Gillman, supra n. 187;
Edward A. Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics
of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America (Yale U. Press 2000).
199. See supra nn. 137-38.
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of courts and outside of Article V.200 Marbury fosters none of these conversations.
That decision is devoted primarily to the authority element of judicial review and
a minor aspect of the jurisdictional element. Commentary on Marbury is limited
to whether and how Justices should exercise the power to declare laws
unconstitutional when deciding cases, and the extent to which such decisions bind
elected officials.2 °'
The Judiciary Act of 1789 and related measures highlight the legislative
responsibility for providing legal and political foundations for judicial review.
American law requires elected officials to establish specific elements of judicial
review (judges) and arguably leaves to their discretion the extent to which other
elements will be established (federal question jurisdiction?). Marbury could not
have been decided in the absence of a Supreme Court or a judiciary act. Judicial
review cannot be maintained unless elected officials or other powerful elites (the
military, industrialists, etc.) support that practice. The Supreme Court would have
had little power to declare state laws unconstitutional had Congress repealed
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, and no power to declare any law unconstitutional
had Jacksonians decided to repeal Article III or treat all judicial rulings as
nullities. 202 Marbury inspires professors and their students to ask why unelected
Justices should be given the power to declare laws unconstitutional. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 inspires professors and their students to ask why elected officials give
unelected Justices the power to declare laws unconstitutional.
The changing nature of judicial practice in American history cannot be fully
realized until the history of legislative debate over judiciary acts is incorporated
into the constitutional canon. The original understanding of judicial review relied
on political foundations that crumbled within a generation. The Judiciary Act of
1789, framed at a time when political parties did not yet exist, temporarily
established anti-partisan and non-partisan judicial review. The Supreme Court,
elected officials assumed, would help prevent partisan factions in the states and,
less often, in the national government from violating constitutional norms.
Elected officials also assumed that the Supreme Court would correct minor
constitutional errors in national legislation. The debate over the Judiciary Act of
1801 was about the viability of anti-partisan judicial review at a time when
political parties existed. The repeal of that Act destroyed anti-partisan review as a
political practice, although not the judicial practice of using anti-partisan rhetoric.
The judicial edifice established in 1789 survived the Jeffersonian attack on
federal courts only because the Marshall Court in Marbury, subsequent Supreme
Court rulings, and subsequent federal legislation placed the judicial power to
declare laws unconstitutional on more secure partisan political foundations.

200. See supra n. 82 and accompanying text.
201. See supra n. 9. This is not to disparage these fine works, but to note that commentary on
Marbury tends to be focused on a different set of issues than commentary on the Judiciary Acts of 1789
and 1801.
202. President Jackson may not have said, "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him
enforce it." Nevertheless, he showed no inclination to enforce judicial decisions inconsistent with his
policies towards Native Americans. See Graber, supra n. 59, at 260-61.
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Legislative attacks on courts were forestalled as judicial review began to be
understood as a means by which important regime goals might be advanced.
Marshall Court decisions after 1.809 advanced policies preferred by members of
the dominant National Republican coalition. Satisfied by judicial performance,
Congress during the 1820s and 1830s first refused to repeal Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act and then, in response to nullification, expanded the jurisdiction of
federal courts.203 Congress after the Civil War further expanded federal
jurisdiction in an effort to secure favorable judicial policies. 2° During the 1960s,
Congress fostered Warren Court decisionmaking by strengthening numerous
elements of judicial review.0 5
These legislative decrees, not Marbury, provide the primary legal and
political foundations for contemporary judicial practice. "The historian of the
Court," Charles Fairman wisely commented, "should keep his watch in the halls of
Congress, not linger within the chamber of the Court. ' ' 106 The same might be said
for the constitutional theorist. As several commentators note, "Congress's power
over federal jurisdiction is 'the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial
20 7
work in a democracy.'
Marbury, properly presented, teaches that judicial review can thrive in a
partisan universe only when at least some crucial political elites support the
general trend of judicial decisions. Judicial opinions may boldly assert, as
Marbury does, that judicial review is necessary to prevent legislative omnipotence.
History and the legislative record say otherwise. Judicial review exists because
legislatures support judicial review. Legislatures support judicial review partly
because they believe that practice will help secure their interests. The antipartisan judicial practice described in Marbury died two years before the decision
was handed down.
Students of comparative constitutionalism repeatedly recognize that nonjudicial actors are usually responsible for establishing judicial review. Alec Sweet
explores how post-war European governments promulgated new constitutions or
constitutional provisions that explicitly authorized justices to consider the
constitutionality of statutes. 2°' Ran Hirschl's "hegemonic preservation thesis"
details how the rise of judicial review in Israel, South Africa, Canada, New
Zealand, and many other countries resulted from actions taken by elected officials
and interest groups fearful of losing political power. "When their hegemony is
increasingly challenged in majoritarian decisionmaking arenas," Hirschl observes,
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204.
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206.
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207. Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 68, at 772 n. 352 (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and
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and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of ConstitutionalPolicymaking by the Judiciary 12833 (Yale U. Press 1982).
208. Stone Sweet, supra n. 66.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss4/4

40

Graber: Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 178
2003]

ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW

powerful elites and their political representatives may deliberately initiate and
support a constitutionalization of rights in order to transfer power to supreme
courts, where they assume, based primarily on the courts' record of adjudication and
on the Justices' ideological preferences, that their policy preferences will be less
contested. In other words, increasing judicial intrusion into the prerogatives of the
legislature and the executive following the enactment of constitutional bills of rights
may provide an efficient institutional solution for influential sociopolitical groups
who seek to preserve their hegemony vis-a-vis marginalized minority groups and
who, given an erosion in their popular support, may find strategic drawbacks in
209
adhering to majoritarian decision-making processes.

European bureaucrats made the crucial decisions that expanded the power of the
European Court of Justice.210 Only in the American constitutional canon is the
serious suggestion made that the primary foundations for judicial review were laid
by self-serving assertions in judicial opinions.
Contemporary constitutional theorizing must take into account the original
establishment of judicial review in 1789 and the constitutional changes responsible
for the transformation of that practice during the nineteenth century.
Constitutional theory, following the canonical analysis in Marbury, regards
judicial review as a check on elected officials. This conception of judicial power
masks how elected officials have historically been responsible for establishing and
maintaining the legal and political foundations for judicial authority. Judicial
review is an ongoing political choice, not a fait accompli.21 Whether that practice
is justifiable depends on whether elected officials have legitimate reasons for
vesting power in the federal judiciary, not on the reasons Justices have given for
exercising that power.212
Contemporary theories of judicial review must justify the practice
established after 1800, not the practice established in 1787 or 1789. The
Constitution of 1800 is a Constitution driven by political parties. No institution
remains exempt from the partisan imperative.213 Contemporary Justices are not
non-partisan legal experts, and they do not review laws made by elected officials
who are expected to rise above party politics. Justices are nominated and
appointed by partisan leaders who have partisan purposes for choosing particular
Justices and for structuring the federal judicial system in particular ways. Theories
of judicial review premised on the non-partisan or anti-partisan federal judiciary
promised by Federalist 78 are no more realistic than constitutional theories that

209. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four ConstitutionalRevolutions, 25 L. & Soc. Inquiry 91, 103-04 (2000).
210. Gordon Silverstein, Presentation, Judicial Power, Economic Integration and Democratic
Legitimacy: A Madisonian Solution to a European Dilemma (Boston, Mass., Sept. 3-6, 1998) (copy on
file with author of article) (paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association).
211. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 173-76 (Princeton U. Press
1999).
212. Mark A. Graber, The Law Professoras Populist, 34 U. Rich L. Rev. 373, 403-10 (2000).
213. See Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadershipfrom John Adams to George
Bush 69-81 (Belknap Press 1993).
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rely on the promise made by Federalist10 that a large republic will prevent the
14
rise of mass political parties.

214. Hamilton, Madison & Jay, supra n. 125, at 77-84.
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